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 Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on 
Truthfulness in Advocacy 
 
W. Bradley Wendel1
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This paper was originally written for the 
Second Legal Ethics Schmooze at Fordham Law School. I am grateful to all participants in 
the Schmooze for helpful discussion and in particular to Ben Zipursky for refusing to let 
me off the hook for waffling on my position and for suggesting the objective vs. subjective 
framing. Additional thanks are due to Dana Remus, participants in faculty workshops at 
Brooklyn and Notre Dame Law Schools, and to the students in Mike Dorf’s Legal 
Scholarship Colloquium at Cornell Law School. 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
A lawyer confronts many features of the world that are given, inflexible, 
and must simply be dealt with; at the same time she has latitude for 
creativity, for the exercise of skill and judgment toward the realization of 
the client’s ends. This is true for lawyers acting in various capacities, 
including as counselors of clients and transactional planners, but is most 
clearly one of the structural features of the lawyer’s role as an advocate for 
her client. Recent law graduates learning the craft of advocacy quickly 
come to understand that, while in law school it was the law that was open-
textured, manipulable, and the wellspring of creative lawyering, in practice 
the facts do not come pre-packaged and accepted as true for the purposes of 
an appellate court’s review, but are highly contingent and the product of the 
interaction between a lawyer and witnesses, documents, and other sources 
of information. It is exactly in this respect, however, that the theory of legal 
ethics is relatively under-developed. David Luban has observed that 
“[e]very lawyer knows tricks of the trade that can be used to do opponents 
out of their legal deserts,”2 including various types of games that can be 
played with facts. Many of these tricks have entered the folklore of 
advocacy techniques – suggestive witness preparation or “coaching” that 
steers the testimony toward a favorable legal conclusion, aggressive cross-
examining of a truthful witness to make the witness seem uncertain or the 
testimony appear false, and the use of truthful bits of evidence to induce the 
jury to draw false inferences. Predictably, the use of these tactics by 
advocates has attracted criticism from those who wonder what any of this 
has to do with the truth-finding function of the adversarial system of 
justice.3 Just as predictably, defenders of these practices appeal to 
individual rights and the American constitutional tradition to evaluate trial 
lawyers as honorable, not unethical, when playing games with the truth.4 
While interesting enough, I think this debate has suffered from a lack of 
                                                 
2
 David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 118 (David 
Luban, ed., 1983). 
3
 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 96-105 (2000); 
RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM 109-16 (1989); Robert P. 
Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central Moral 
Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REV. 563 (1996); A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of 
Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search 
for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). 
4
 See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, 
CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH (2001); Monroe H. Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 
64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). 
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engagement with foundational normative issues in legal ethics, in particular 
the problem of the role of law and the legal profession in maintaining 
political legitimacy.  
 
The deeper debate within theoretical legal ethics is dominated by the 
issue of role-differentiated morality – that is, the problem of how it can be 
that someone occupying a social role is permitted to do something that 
would ordinarily be morally wrongful.5 This issue arises because lawyers 
are said to adhere to a set of principles known as the standard conception of 
legal ethics.6 The standard conception consists of three principles – two of 
action, and one of evaluation. The principle of partisanship states that the 
lawyer’s duties are owed to the client and not to third parties, society as a 
whole, the public interest, or anything else. The principle of neutrality 
directs lawyers not to consider reasons, values, emotions, commitments, or 
relationships that might tend to conflict with the client’s interests or 
diminish the lawyer’s vigor in representing the client. Finally, the principle 
of non-accountability is the evaluative principle, directing observers not to 
criticize lawyers in moral terms who respect the principles of partisanship 
and neutrality; any moral blame belongs properly to the client, in respect of 
her ends and actions. According to the traditional, unmodified version of the 
standard conception, the interests of clients should have primacy in the 
lawyer’s ethical worldview.7 Because the mere interests of clients are 
beside the point, morally speaking, critics of the standard conception have 
doubted that lawyers really have a moral permission to engage in conduct 
that otherwise would be evaluated as wrongful.8 The standard conception’s 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
3 (1980) (posing the strong conception of role differentiation as the claim that “the 
occupant of the position [is] permitted or required to ignore or weigh less heavily what 
would otherwise be morally overriding considerations in the relations into which he enters 
as a professional”). 
6
 See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD 
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 5-12(2009).   
7
 The default cite for this position is a speech in the English House of Commons by 
Lord Henry Brougham, defending Queen Caroline on adultery charges: 
 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, 
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and 
at all hazards and costs to other persons . . . is his first and only duty; and in 
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction 
which he may bring upon others. 
 
Quoted in DARE, supra note __, at 6; Frankel, supra note __, at 1036.  
8
 See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES (1999); DAVID 
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988). 
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defenders have therefore sought to locate some moral value, such as loyalty, 
trust, or human dignity, that could serve as the normative foundation for the 
lawyer-client relationship.9   
 
One feature of the debate over the standard conception has proven 
unsatisfactory to some scholars. The traditional debate seems to have little 
to do with the institutional setting of the lawyer’s role. Lawyers are not just 
moral agents, although of course they remain moral agents even when 
acting within a social role. They also play a part in the social practice of 
governance of citizens through law in a liberal democratic state. The 
criticism or justification of the actions of lawyers should therefore have 
something to do with more general considerations within political theory, 
such as democratic legitimacy, the authority of law, and the duties of 
citizens with respect to legal institutions. In recent years, legal ethics 
scholarship has changed its emphasis, to take account of issues in 
democratic theory and legal philosophy.10 For example, one might argue 
that the law is best understood as a means for resolving social conflict and 
establishing a framework of rights and duties, using fair procedures, that 
citizens can use to decide how to act under a shared public justification.11 
From this theoretical account of the nature of law and the legal system, 
certain duties of lawyers might follow. If the law represents a settlement of 
normative conflict, lawyers should not be allowed to re-introduce 
controversial views about what one ought to do, if there is a legal rule on 
point resolving disagreement over that issue. Many critics of the standard 
conception would permit a lawyer to employ clever work-arounds to evade 
the requirements of a law the lawyer believes to be unjust.12 If the law has 
                                                 
9
  See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t 
Busy Assaulting It), in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 66 (2007) [hereinafter “Luban, 
Upholders”] (considering human dignity as the foundational value in the advocacy setting, 
while remaining skeptical of the standard conception generally); Charles Fried, The Lawyer 
as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 
(1976) (relying on the value of loyalty and an analogy with friendship). 
10
 See, e.g., DARE, supra note __; W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO 
LAW (2010); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008); Norman Spaulding, 
The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1377 (2008) (reviewing LUBAN, supra note __).   
11
  See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2012); MARKOVITS, supra note __,  at 173-75; 
DARE, supra note __, at 60-63. The word “citizen” as used here is similarly meant to 
suggest a distinction between ordinary and political morality, the idea being that one 
remains a “person in the background culture and a citizen in the public forum.” Burton 
Dreeben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 
317, 325 (Samuel Freeman, ed., 2003). Rights and duties associated with citizenship have 
to do with the way one acts, and justifies oneself, to others in terms of public reasons. 
12
 Deborah Rhode and William Simon have both used as an example a case in which a 
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moral value as a means of reaching a shared public resolution of contested 
issues about justice, however, a lawyer would act wrongfully by planning 
around it. Ethical lawyering means, among other things, responding 
appropriately to the reasons for action created by the law.13 It may require 
not only refraining from actively evading the law, but also understanding 
the content of legal rules not from the Holmesian bad man perspective of 
“what can I get away with,” but from the point of view of the law as it 
would be understood by an impartial member of an interpretive 
community.14 
 
The question to be taken up in this essay is, if one believes that being an 
ethical lawyer has something to do with democratic legitimacy and the 
authority of law, what practical stance must a lawyer take with respect to 
facts? By “facts” I mean here not that which has been established 
conclusively at trial, but bits and pieces of raw data or evidence that bear on 
questions of fact in dispute, including the accounts of witnesses, documents, 
observations, and so on.15 Manipulating facts can be just as effective a 
means of evading the requirements of law as manipulating the law through 
too-clever-by-half interpretations. Is one who sees the lawyer’s role through 
the lens of democratic political theory therefore committed to condemning 
                                                                                                                            
lawyer representing an applicant for public benefits could advise the client to engage in a 
relatively minor deception and thereby avoid a substantial loss in her benefits. The reason 
they give for the moral permissibility of this deceit is the patent inadequacy of the existing 
benefits scheme to address the material needs of people with limited incomes. See W. 
BRADLEY WENDEL, ETHICS AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 121-25 (2014) (discussing 
Rhode and Simon’s analysis of this case and other approaches one might take). 
13
 I generally follow those legal philosophers who understand the law as creating 
reasons for action, i.e. changing the normative situation of those subject to it. See, e.g., 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 23-69 (1986); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW 30 (1979); Jules Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 120 YALE L.J. 1 
(2011); Andrei Marmor, An Institutional Conception of Authority, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
238 (2011). 
14
  This, at least, is the principal argument of WENDEL, supra note __. 
15
 Accordingly, the subject matter of the paper is not really “truth” in any 
philosophically interesting sense. Joshua Cohen, for example, asks whether a liberal 
political theory can employ a concept of truth, or whether the constraint of offering public 
reasons precludes resort to truth. See also Joshua Cohen, Truth and Public Reason 37 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 2 (2009). The adversary system of litigation, by its nature, is concerned with 
smaller-scale questions of truth, not only the proverbial question in criminal trials, “did he 
do it?”, but more complex questions about the state of mind of an actor (e.g. did the 
defendant have a reasonable belief that his life was in danger) or some evaluative matter 
(e.g. is this consumer product reasonably safe as designed?). Even at that level of 
generality, one can ask even more specific questions, such as what practical stance an 
advocate may (or must) take with respect to the testimony of a witness, an item of physical 
evidence, and so on. That question is the subject of this paper. 
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the “tricks of the trade” of the advocate as unethical?16 The answer to this 
question depends on the perspective one takes on the relationship between 
the role of lawyers as advocate and the contribution made by advocacy to 
legal legitimacy. To speak very generally for now, this relationship can take 
two forms. 17 It can be: (1) Objective, so that the most important criterion of 
legal legitimacy what is the case, based on both law and facts – i.e. whether 
the client does or does not have a legal entitlement to do what is in her 
interests; or (2) subjective, so that the most important criterion for 
legitimacy is whether the legal system has taken into account the client’s 
own perspective, the story she has to tell.  
 
Once we are clear on the right perspective to take, it should be possible 
to specify more particularly what practical attitude lawyers ought to take 
with respect to facts and, even more specifically, what sorts of tactics and 
stratagems should be deemed unethical.18 Should lawyers remain agnostic 
about their clients’ stories, for example, and refrain from taking active steps 
to ensure against a result that would be inconsistent with the truth? May 
lawyers assist their clients in crafting their testimony to make a favorable 
outcome more likely? What ethical limitations (apart from the requirements 
contained in rules of procedure) exist on bringing legal contentions with an 
inadequate factual foundation? Under what conditions, if ever, should 
lawyers be required to intervene to prevent the distortion of the truth-
finding function of the adversary system? While lawyers have discussed 
many of these questions with reference to specific prohibitions in the law of 
lawyering on presenting false evidence, there has been very little analysis of 
the connection between these prescriptions and more general considerations 
of the authority and legitimacy of law. Thus, what this essay hopes to 
accomplish is the grounding of particular duties with respect to facts in 
general theoretical considerations relating to legality and legitimacy. 
 
Almost every scholar who has considered the problem of connecting 
ethical prescriptions for lawyers with considerations of political legitimacy, 
including Geoffrey Hazard and Dana Remus,19 Daniel Markovits,20 William 
                                                 
16
 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Positivism and the Good Lawyer: A Commentary on 
W. Bradley Wendel’s Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1165 (2011). 
17
 Zipursky, supra note __, at 1180. 
18
 To be clear, by “unethical” here I mean in a critical, philosophical, or “ethics beyond 
the rules” sense. While the discussion may occasionally refer to some aspect of the law 
governing lawyers, that law is not the primary focus of this paper. There are plenty of 
things lawyers may do within the rules, or may get away with if they’re clever, which raise 
issues from the standpoint of philosophical ethics. 
19
 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 751 (2011).  
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Simon,21 and David Luban,22 has come down on the subjective side of the 
debate, albeit for differing reasons. Hazard and Remus, for example, lean 
hard on epistemological considerations, arguing that lawyers lack adequate 
grounds for reaching conclusions about the truth of matters in dispute in 
litigation,23 while Luban emphasizes the importance of protecting the 
dignity of clients by allowing them to tell their own stories, in their own 
way, without interference by a lawyer.24 The aim of this paper is therefore 
to defend an unpopular position – the objective perspective – and to argue 
that lawyers’ ethical duties with respect to facts are constrained by what is 
the case. Notice that this constraint (“what is the case”) brackets the 
epistemological question, how does a lawyer know what is the case? As the 
argument develops, matters of epistemology will be introduced gradually, 
but for clarity it will begin with the assumption that the lawyer knows some 
fact to be true. It may be that, as the assumption is relaxed, lawyers will 
have ethical duties that vary according to the level of certainty they have 
with respect to the truth of some factual issue. But the baseline duty, in any 
case, on the objective perspective is to contribute to the resolution of 
controversies on their legal and factual merits. Political legitimacy depends 
on adhering to ideals of truthfulness in politics. The alternative, subjective 
perspective on the relationship between legitimacy and advocacy, although 
emphasizing the extremely important value of human dignity, ultimately 
leads to a cynical, bullshitty (in Harry Frankfurt’s sense25) style of advocacy 
that undermines its own claim to political legitimacy. 
 
This does not mean that lawyers have a direct obligation to seek the 
truth. Our adversarial system of litigation presupposes that each party and 
its advocate will have its own perspective on the truth and be permitted to 
argue for it, and introduce evidence in support of it, at trial.26 The general 
theoretical orientation of the adversarial system toward partisan 
perspectives on the truth has, however, tended to make lawyers forget that 
they have some responsibility with respect to the truthfulness of litigated 
matters.27 Following Bernard Williams, I distinguish between truth with 
                                                                                                                            
20
 See MARKOVITS, supra note __.  
21
 See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998). 
22
 See Luban, Upholders, supra note __. 
23
 See Hazard & Remus, supra note __, at 760-61. 
24
 See Luban, Upholders, supra note __, at 73. 
25
 See HARRY FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005) (distinguishing bullshit from lies on 
the attitude displayed by the speaker toward the facts – lying is an attempt to evade the 
truth, while bullshitting is indifferent to it).  
26
 See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Adversary System of Justice, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (Hugh LaFollette, ed., 2013). 
27
 Doctrinally this responsibility is expressed by pleading standards that require an 
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respect to some belief (“it is true that P,” where P would be something like 
“the defendant robbed the victim,” or “the plaintiff was standing right here 
when the accident occurred”) and truthfulness as an ideal that may apply to 
a process or institution of government.28 Legal ethics has tended to be quite 
preoccupied with issues concerning truth, particularly in the detailed rules 
governing the introduction of false testimony or evidence.29 This emphasis 
                                                                                                                            
attorney to ensure, and certify to the court, that there is an adequate factual basis for a 
contention. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
intended to remind, underscore, and enforce attorneys’ “responsibility to the judicial 
system as officers of the court.” 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1331 (3d. ed. & Supp. 2015). More recently, the Supreme Court has 
replaced the formerly liberal pleading standard with a requirement that factual contentions 
be plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). Some commentators have suggested that the increasingly intrusive 
regulation of the conduct of litigation advocates is the result of attorneys refusing to 
conduct themselves ethically by exercising self-restraint. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, 
Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 
CONN. L. REV. 7(1987); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 
69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
28
 See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS (2002); Bernard 
Williams, Truth, Politics, and Self-Deception, in IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED 
154(Geoffrey Hawthorn, ed., 2005). Compare RAWLS, supra note __, at 62 (“being 
reasonable is not an epistemological idea . . . [r]ather, it is part of a political ideal of 
democratic citizenship”). 
29
 See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 3.3 [hereinafter, “MODEL 
RULE xx”]. This rule states clearly that a lawyer may not offer evidence that she knows to 
be false. However, the rule and its interpretation by courts recognizes duties to interdict 
false evidence only in cases in which the lawyer knows the evidence is false. Knowledge, 
for the purpose of these duties, is defined as actual, subjective knowledge. See MODEL 
RULE 1.0(f). A long history of judicial interpretation of the rule makes clear that, where the 
witness is the defendant in a criminal case, knowledge means something approximating 
Cartesian certainty, and in the absence of the client’s express affirmation of an intent to lie 
on the stand, courts will be very reluctant to find that the lawyer knew about the client’s 
contemplated perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003). In 
one leading state court case the defendant told an utterly preposterous story and, when 
confronted by the lawyer with the story’s inconsistency with the testimony of other 
witnesses, the client said, “I’ll say what I need to say to help myself out and if I have 
something untruthful to say I’ll say that. I need to help myself out.” State v. McDowell, 681 
N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 2004). he lawyer discussed his concern that the client may perjure 
himself with the trial judge, and the judge permitted the lawyer to call the client as a 
witness but have him testify in the form of a narrative. The client was convicted, and on 
appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the lawyer’s performance at trial was 
constitutionally ineffective because he revealed to the trial court what he believed to be the 
client’s intent to commit perjury, and he also put on the client’s testimony in narrative 
form. The court said that a lawyer may take remedial measures, such as refusing to assist 
his client in testifying, only where the lawyer knows based on an affirmative statement of 
intent from the client that the client intends to perjure himself. Courts in civil cases are 
somewhat more likely to find, based on circumstantial evidence, that a lawyer must have 
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on truth as a propositional matter has obscured the ethical analysis that 
should apply to practices, such as evidence gathering, the conduct of civil 
discovery, witness preparation, and the examination of witnesses at trial. 
The legitimacy of the civil justice system depends on its being a process of 
reason-giving, which in turn depends on the reasons having something to do 
with what actually is the case, as a matter of fact. But “every statement in [a 
narrative] can be true and it can still tell the wrong story.”30 Truth alone 
does not supply the normative foundation for the ethics of advocacy; 
lawyers must also be concerned about telling a story that makes sense in 
relation to other values embodied in the legal system, such as justice and 
rights.  
 
The argument begins, in Section II, by giving three examples of the way 
in which lawyers in the role of advocate can affect the presentation of 
evidence to a trier of fact. The first two are from civil litigation, and the 
third from a criminal prosecution. As I have argued elsewhere, criminal 
defense is a special case, and it is a serious mistake to generalize, from the 
ethical duties and permissions a criminal defense lawyer has, to conclusions 
about legal ethics more generally.31 The distinctiveness of criminal defense 
is not due only to the high stakes for the defendant; plenty of civil cases 
have potentially very serious potential downsides, including loss of liberty 
(in civil commitment proceedings), deprivation of parental rights, and huge 
financial penalties. Rather, criminal cases are different because they directly 
implicate the power of the state to deprive citizens of liberty or even their 
lives, and therefore require heightened procedural protections for the rights 
of defendants. The presumption of innocence, the requirement that the 
prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, 
the privilege against self-incrimination, and prohibitions on introducing 
wrongfully obtained evidence are all, fundamentally speaking, about 
securing the rights of citizens against the state. The defendant’s 
constitutional rights create ethical duties for the defense lawyer that weigh 
against the end of truth-seeking that would ordinarily be foundational in an 
adversarial system of adjudication. The role of the criminal defense lawyer 
is accordingly characterized by distinctive ethical norms, including the duty 
to “put the state to its proof” – i.e. to require that the prosecution prove each 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. That duty frees the lawyer 
from what would otherwise be  requirements, imposed by rules of 
professional conduct and procedural law, to refrain from making any 
                                                                                                                            
had actual, subjective knowledge of the falsity of some item of evidence. See, e.g., United 
States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993). 
30
 WILLIAMS, supra note __, at 244. 
31
 WENDEL, supra note __, at 58.  
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contention without an adequate factual basis and to take action to prevent or 
correct false testimony by a client or non-client witness.32 In the third 
example in Section II, the distinctive ethical role of the criminal defense 
attorney permits a certain amount of creativity with factual arguments that 
would not be permissible for an advocate in a civil case. To emphasize: I 
agree with the defense of the unique ethical obligations of lawyers in 
criminal defense representation, but I do wish to challenge the tendency to 
overgeneralize from this special case. 
 
With these examples in mind of lawyers playing games with facts, 
Section III considers several recent, sophisticated defenses of the subjective 
perspective on factual truth, which emphasize the lawyer’s obligation to tell 
the client’s story, as the client sees it. Each of these explorations of the 
relationship between truthfulness and legal ethics is concerned, in one way 
or another, with the question of legitimacy. I follow Rawls in differentiating 
legitimacy from justice.33 The reason for this distinction is bound up with 
the functional account of law which emphasizes the role of democratic 
procedures in “making decisions when the conflicts and disagreements in 
political life make unanimity impossible or rarely to be expected.”34 
Disagreement over the justice of a measure (a would-be right, rule for the 
allocation of resources, etc.) is what makes government necessary in the 
first place; if we could all agree on what is permitted or prohibited in a 
society, there would be no need for law. As a result, the legitimacy of a law 
must be, to some extent, independent of its content.35 But what can one say 
about one who represents another with respect to legal rights and duties if 
the authority of a law is independent of its moral merit, justice, or other 
substantive characteristics? This question connects the ethical obligations of 
lawyers with the sources of legal legitimacy and, specifically, raises the 
question whether truthfulness is a condition of legitimacy. There are reasons 
(or so several of us have argued) that citizens have an obligation to respect 
the law despite the lack of a necessary connection between moral merit and 
authority. Does it then follow that there need be no necessary connection 
between truthfulness and legitimate authority?  
                                                 
32
 See MODEL RULES, supra note __, Rule 3.1 (prohibiting lawyers from making any 
contention that is frivolous – meaning lacking an adequate legal and factual basis – but 
then stating that a criminal defense lawyer “may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as 
to require that every element of the case be established”).  
33
 See JOHN RAWLS, Reply to Habermas, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 372, 427-30 
(paperback ed. 1993); see generally Richard E. Flathman, Legitimacy, in A COMPANION TO 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 678 (Robert E. Goodin, et al., eds., 2d ed., 2012). 
34
 RAWLS, supra note __, at 428. 
35
 See H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM 243, 254-55 (1984). 
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 I argue for a negative answer in Section IV, relying on the connection 
between lawyers as advocates and the process of reason-giving that is 
characteristic of legality as a distinctive mode of governance. Political 
ethics, including legal ethics, must begin with what Rawls calls the burdens 
of judgment: We must propose fair terms of cooperation with others while 
acknowledging reasonable pluralism, which is based on the diverse and 
incompatible sources of human value, as well as conflicting evidence and 
uncertainty about the facts bearing on the resolution of normative 
disagreement.36 In so doing we have to be reasonable, but what criteria of 
reasonableness can we settle on where there is such deep disagreement over 
values? In my view, the lawyer’s ethical role in advocacy is to contribute to 
a process of giving public reasons in support of workable principles – 
conceptions of justice – that comprise a resolution of social conflict. These 
reasons must be based on the sorts of considerations that affected citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse. Stated in this way, however, it is 
still an open question whether lawyers should take the objective or 
subjective perspective on truthfulness. Perhaps the process of giving public 
reasons is necessarily dependent upon stories being told directly by clients, 
with minimal interference by their representatives. Thus, much of the 
burden of the argument in Section IV will be to show that this ideal of 
public reason contains an implicit commitment to truthfulness in political 
discourse, including the presentation of evidence in litigation, and that this 
commitment entails the objective perspective. 
 
II. GAMES LAWYERS PLAY. 
 
A.   Coaching Witnesses. 
 
American lawyers, to a considerably greater extent than is accepted 
anywhere else in the common law world,37 believe their professional 
                                                 
36
 RAWLS, supra note __, at 54-58 
37
 See, e.g., BAR STANDARDS BOARD (U.K.) HANDBOOK, Conduct Rules, Rule C2, 
rC9.4 (“you must not rehearse, practise with or coach a witness in respect of their 
evidence”); NEW SOUTH WALES BARRISTERS’ RULES, Rule 68(b) (2014) (“A barrister must 
not . . . coach a witness by advising what answers the witness should give to questions 
which might be asked”). But see LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERS ACT (LAWYERS: 
CONDUCT AND CLIENT CARE) RULES 2008 (NEW ZEALAND), Rule 13.10.8, n.24 (“A lawyer 
may assist a witness in preparing to give evidence by assisting in the preparation of a brief 
of evidence, and by pointing out gaps, inconsistencies in the evidence (with that witness’s 
evidence or the evidence of other witnesses), the inadmissible nature of proposed evidence, 
or irrelevancies in evidence that the witness is proposing to give.”).  
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obligations permit, or even require, them to spend time preparing clients 
and friendly witnesses to testify at trial or in a deposition. The process of 
preparing witnesses gives lawyers an opportunity to influence the 
development of their testimony in a way that accords better with the 
applicable law. Legal ethics teachers used to talk about the “lecture” scene 
from Anatomy of a Murder, but since hardly any students in this generation 
have seen that movie, it has lost its relevance as an illustration. Thus, I will 
use two more recent examples, one from a New York personal-injury case 
and the other from a Texas law firm representing plaintiffs in litigation 
against manufacturers of products containing asbestos.  
 
In the New York case, two lawyers represented a client who tripped and 
fell on a sidewalk.38 The client initially told the lawyers that the sidewalk 
was in front of a church. When the lawyers investigated the site, they 
discovered no defects in the sidewalk directly in front of the church, i.e. on 
the same side of the street as the church, but significant cracks in the 
sidewalk across the street, directly in front of a house. They informed the 
client that if she testified that she fell on the sidewalk in front of the church, 
she would have no claim because that sidewalk was in good condition. The 
client dutifully reported that when she said she fell “in front of the church,” 
she meant that was walking across the street from the church, on the 
cracked sidewalk. The lawyers were charged with misconduct including 
“fail[ing] to ascertain the location of their client's accident in a non-
suggestive manner.” They ultimately were disciplined for violation of the 
catch-all rule of professional conduct proscribing conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit of misrepresentation,39 and the rule against 
conduct that would adversely reflect on an attorney’s fitness to practice 
law,40 but not the rule on participating in the creation of false evidence.41  
 
One of the attorneys conceded that “the way [the client] came to allege 
that she fell where she fell was influenced by the way I explained the law to 
her.” One may nevertheless imagine a relatively innocuous version of the 
conversation with the client. Suppose after a brief initial meeting at which 
the client said she fell on a cracked sidewalk in front of the Bryn Mawr 
Presbyterian Church on Lockwood Avenue in Yonkers, the attorneys visited 
the site, noticed that the sidewalk directly in front of the church was in good 
repair, but the sidewalk across the street was badly cracked. One of the 
                                                 
38
 In re Rios, 109 A.D.3d 64, 965 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep’t 2013). 
39
 NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 8.4(c) [hereinafter, “NEW YORK RULE 
xx”]. 
40
 NEW YORK RULES, supra note __, Rule 8.4(h). 
41
 NEW YORK RULES, supra note __, Rule 3.4(a)(3). 
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attorneys then called up the client and asked: 
 
When you said you fell “in front of the church,” do you mean on the 
sidewalk directly in front of the church or were you across the street? 
 
The client then might respond, “Oh right – sorry – I said in front of the 
church because it was an obvious landmark, but I was actually walking 
across the street.” Presumably there would be nothing wrong with having 
that conversation. It certainly would not rise to the level of knowledge of 
the falsity of the statement made by the client, for the purposes of the rule 
on witness perjury.42 The attorneys in the disciplinary case admitted, 
however, that they intended to influence the client to tell a story consistent 
with the liability of the homeowner, not the church. Thus, while they may 
not have known the client’s story was false, they were at least indifferent to 
its truth or falsity – they had a story they were determined to get the client 
to tell, and they influenced her to do so by means of an “explanation of the 
law” in which they told her she would not have a case unless she testified 
that she fell across the street from the church. 
 
In the Texas case, a law firm representing plaintiffs in asbestos litigation 
gave a document to its clients entitled “Preparing for Your Depositions,” to 
assist them in giving testimony that would help their cases. The plaintiffs 
had been exposed in the course of their employment as pipefitters, shipyard 
workers, and the like, many years ago, but due to the long latency period of 
asbestos-caused diseases, were only now bringing lawsuits. It was entirely 
possible that they had forgotten many details about their workplaces, since 
in many cases they had not worked around the asbestos-containing products 
for decades. The law firm’s witness-preparation memo accordingly included 
tips such as the following: 
 
How well you know the name of each product and how you were 
exposed to it will determine whether that defendant will want to offer 
you a settlement. 
 
Remember to say you saw the NAMES on the BAGS.… 
 
It is important to emphasize that you had NO IDEA ASBESTOS WAS 
DANGEROUS when you were working around it. 
 
It is important to maintain that you NEVER saw any labels on asbestos 
                                                 
42
 Compare NEW YORK RULES, supra note __, Rule 3.3(a). 
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products that said WARNING or DANGER.… 
 
You may be asked how you are able to recall so many product names. 
The best answer is to say that you recall seeing the names on the 
containers or on the product itself. The more you thought about it, the 
more you remembered!43 
 
Defenders of the law firm argued that the memo could be seen as 
nothing more than a means to ensure that unsophisticated first-time 
litigants, who might understandably be intimidated by the process of being 
deposed and thus prone to uncertainty or memory lapses, would be able to 
present truthful testimony in a coherent manner.44 But think about it for a 
minute. Consider the prompt in the memo,  
 
Remember to say you saw the NAMES on the BAGS . . . You may be 
asked how you are able to recall so many product names. The best 
answer is to say that you recall seeing the names on the containers or on 
the product itself. The more you thought about it, the more you 
remembered!  
 
In a products liability action, one of the elements of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case is to identify the manufacturer of the product. Asbestos fibers, 
generically, are dangerous, but there is some variation in the danger posed 
by various asbestos-containing products due to variation in the degree to 
which the product is “friable” – i.e. capable of releasing asbestos fibers into 
the air where they can be breathed in.45 Even if the danger presented was 
the same among a category of product (say, pipe insulation or cement) is 
uniform, products liability law still, in most cases, requires the plaintiff to 
identify the manufacturer.46 Doctrinally, this follows from the cause-in-fact 
showing that is an element of any tort claim.47 While a few decisions have 
relaxed the requirement of identifying a specific defendant where the 
product in question is truly fungible, as in the case of some generic drugs,48 
                                                 
43
  See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS (4th ed. 2013) (discussing a problem based on this case, and citing 14 
ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT 48-54 (1998)).  
44
 See, e.g., William W. Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses–
Zealously, Within the Bounds of Law, 30 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1999). 
45
 See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1336-41 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (including Appendix describing asbestos litigation in detail). 
46
 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN 
THE COURTS 183-84 (1986). 
47
 See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.3, at 40 (2d ed. 2008).  
48
 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (using share of the relevant 
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that avenue was not available in the asbestos cases. Thus, the plaintiffs 
would have been required to testify that they remember that the product 
they used was manufactured by Owens-Corning, Eagle Picher, or any one 
of a number of other manufacturers whose products were on the market at 
the time the plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos.  
 
Notably, not all of the manufacturers were still solvent, many having 
been bankrupted by previous rounds of lawsuits.49 The witness preparation 
memos thus helpfully included a list of still-solvent manufacturers whose 
products may have been used in the plaintiffs’ workplaces. The obvious 
suggestion for all but the thickest plaintiff was to “remember” having seen 
those products around which were manufactured by Company X, thereby 
satisfying the requirement of showing a causal connection between the 
injury and the product produced by a solvent defendant. As in the sidewalk 
case, the lawyers supplied a missing piece of the factual puzzle – a crucial 
bit of evidence the plaintiff would have to show in order to establish an 
entitlement to damages. Many observers have the intuition that something is 
wrong with the lawyer filling in gaps in the plaintiff’s proof in this way, but 
interestingly there is no explicit prohibition in the rule of professional 
conduct on doing exactly that. It is telling that the lawyers in New York 
were disciplined for violating the catch-all rule on conduct “conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,”50 and not one of 
the specific prohibitions on presenting false evidence or falsifying 
evidence.51 Without knowledge that the client’s initial version of events was 
actually true, how can the lawyers be deemed to have falsified evidence by 
suggesting that she make her story more detailed by indicating that she fell 
on the sidewalk across the street, which is still, in a sense, “in front of” the 
church? There is no prohibition on “true-ifying” evidence, and maybe the 
lawyers were merely assisting the client to clarify her story.52  
                                                                                                                            
generic-drug market to establish but-for causation). 
49
 See generally Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in 
Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983). 
50
 See MODEL RULES, supra note __, Rule 8.4(c). The New York version of this rule is 
substantively identical. 
51
 See MODEL RULES, supra note __,RULES 3.3(a), 3.4(b). Again, the New York 
version of the rules impose the same duties. 
52
 See, e.g., Gaia Envtl., Inc. v. Galbraith, __ S.W.3d __, 2014 WL 4415221 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 2014) (holding that criminal prohibition on witness tampering applies only 
where lawyer seeks to persuade witness to testify falsely, not merely to change testimony); 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir.1993) (“It is one thing to ask a 
witness to swear to facts which are knowingly false. It is another thing, in an arms-length 
interview with a witness, for an attorney to attempt to persuade her, even aggressively, that 
her initial version of a certain fact situation is not complete or accurate.”). Bill Hodes made 
a similar argument in defense of the Baron & Budd memo. It would have been improper to 
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I have long been a critic of the catch-all provisions of Rule 8.4, which 
sometimes are interpreted to reach conduct addressed in specific terms in 
other rules. For example, there are specific prohibitions in the rules on 
attorneys making false statements to third parties and falsely stating or 
implying that they are disinterested.53 Do these rules apply to the use by 
lawyers of undercover investigators to develop evidence favorable to a 
client’s case? Consider, for example, the use of discrimination “testers” – 
for example, actors portraying a black family and a white family who both 
apply to rent an apartment, to determine whether the landlord is engaging in 
prohibited housing discrimination. The absence of a specific rule on witness 
coaching may suggest that lawyers have considerable latitude to intervene 
in the preparation of cases, by the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
canon of statutory construction.54 On the other hand, the noscitur a sociis 
canon suggests interpretation of ambiguous words (such as “conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”) in context, by 
considering what sorts of other words are associated with it.55 While the 
rule on conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, etc., is tacked on to the end of 
the rules of professional conduct, other rules do prohibit interfering in 
particular ways with the discovery and presentation of evidence at trial, 
without necessarily being limited in scope to falsifying evidence.56  
                                                                                                                            
circulate the memo if the lawyers were knowingly falsifying the witnesses’ testimony, but 
there is no reason to believe they had any knowledge of this effect; thus, in retrospect we 
cannot conclude that the law firm violated the law by disseminating the memo. See Hodes, 
supra note __, at 1347-49. It is a much closer question, however, when analyzed from the 
ex ante point of view. Should a law firm prepare a similar memo to prepare its clients for 
depositions? At this points Hodes notes a pair of risks: Either a truthful client will forget, 
under the pressure of being deposed, having clearly seen (and recalling) the manufacturer’s 
name on the product, or a mendacious client will substitute a manufacturer’s name from the 
list of solvent companies in the memo for the name he actually recalls from his 
employment. Hodes argues that, as between the risk of under-serving one’s client as a loyal 
and committed advocate, and the risk of introducing false testimony, the lawyer ought to 
err on the side of client service, absent knowledge that the evidence is false. Id. at 1355-56. 
To put it differently, in terms to be explored later in this paper, as long as a lawyer does not 
cross the lines established by the rules of professional conduct, ethics-beyond-the-rules 
permits and may even require lawyers to engage in effective witness preparation. 
53
 See MODEL RULES 4.1, 4.3. 
54
 “Inclusion of one thing implies exclusion of the other.” See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 824 (2002); Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496 
(Va. 1938) (interpreting statute referring to “any horse, mule, cattle, hog, sheep or goat” as 
not covering turkeys).  
55
  ESKRIDGE, supra note __, at 822. 
56
 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note __, Rules 3.4(a) (unlawfully obstructing other 
parties’ access to evidence), 3.4(e) (alluding to irrelevant matters at trial), 3.4(f) (requesting 
witnesses to refrain from giving relevant information to another party), 3.5(b) (ex parte 
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As it turns out, the law governing lawyers appears to regard the use of 
deception as permissible in anti-discrimination cases, but potentially a 
violation of the rules of professional conduct in other types of cases, 
without giving any principled distinction between the two.57 The point of 
this discussion, however, is not to analyze the exposure of lawyers to 
disciplinary sanctions; rather, it is to explore legal ethics “beyond the rules,” 
as it were, to determine whether lawyers are morally justified when they 
engaging in actions such as suggestive witness preparation that effectively 
turns their clients into ventriloquist’s dummies. In keeping with the theme 
of recent contributions to the theoretical legal ethics debate, this analysis 
does not proceed in terms of ordinary moral categories such as lying or 
deception.58 Instead, it begins with concepts within political morality, such 
as legitimacy and the rule of law. Getting the foundation right does not yet 
answer the question concerning the permissibility of the games lawyers play 
with evidence, but it gets us closer to a satisfactory answer. As the next 
example shows, the best way to understand the ethics of advocacy is from 
the standpoint of the legal rights of clients and the relationship between 
facts and legal rights. 
                                                                                                                            
communications with judges or jurors), 4.2 (communicating with represented parties). 
57
 See, e.g., In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (applying Oregon version of Rule 8.4(c) 
to actions of undercover investigator); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 577, 605-06 (2005) (correctly observing that, whatever we think of it as a 
policy matter, the use of testers is straightforwardly a violation of rule 4.1); David B. Isbell 
& Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover 
Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting 
Misrepresentation Under The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 791 (1995) (giving, to my mind at least, a pretty unconvincing defense of the 
propriety of using “testers”); William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence 
Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV.  1903 (1993) (arguing for permissibility of deceptive 
investigative tactics in criminal, but not civil, cases). 
58
  See, e.g., EVELIN SULLIVAN, THE CONCISE BOOK OF LYING (2001); SISSELA BOK, 
LYING (1978). The obligatory cite on the morality of lying is of course Kant’s 
uncompromising view. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 402-03 (James W. Ellington trans. 1981), at 15; IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON 
ETHICS 224-27 (Louis Infield trans. 1930). For analysis of the ethics of lying and deception 
by lawyers, see, e.g., LUBET, supra note __; RiCHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE 
MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 142-82 (1999); Symposium, Law & Truth:  
Pre-Modernism, Modernism, and Post-Modernism, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 3 (2003); 
Stephen Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 895 (2000); Richard H. 
Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 KY. L. REV. 919 (1999); John A. Humbach, 
The National Association of Honest Lawyers:  An Essay on Honesty, “Lawyer Honesty” 
and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV. 93 (1999); Peter Meijes Tiersma, 
The Language of Perjury:  “Literal Truth,” Ambiguity, and the False Statement 
Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373 (1990); Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True 
Look False and the False Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988). 
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B.   Insufficiently Supported Factual Arguments.  
 
Among its other functions, the legal system assigns rights to citizens 
that they can employ in their dealings with one another, to ground a special 
mode of justification that stands apart from mere power and possibility. 
Suppose someone is harmed and says, “hey, you can’t do that to me.” The 
person who committed the act may respond, “sure I can – try to stop me!” if 
he is strong or well-connected enough to get away with it. But this is not a 
model of relating to one’s fellow citizens that manifests respect for the other 
as a free and equal person. One source of the moral attractiveness of the law 
is its capacity to create the possibility of dealing with others under a 
description not of power but of right.59 Suppose someone publishes an 
offensive newspaper editorial that adherents of a minority religion consider 
blasphemous. As against the claim, “hey, you can’t do that to me,” the 
newspaper’s justification would not merely be “you can’t stop me,” but 
might refer to the legal right of freedom of the press. Of course this may not 
be a complete explanation; one may have a legal right and it might still be 
obnoxious to exercise it. The point is merely that, conceptually speaking, 
the law makes it possible to offer a justification that refers to a kind of 
collective solution to a social problem, and thereby invokes the idea of a 
legitimate ground for the exercise of power over another. 
 
Legal philosophers sometimes talk as though the most important step in 
the establishment of legal rights is the action by some authoritative 
institution, such as a legislature, that invests a general norm, of the form “A 
may do Φ to B, under conditions C,” with the property of legal validity. In 
familiar Hartian terminology, a legal system includes a secondary rule, 
called a rule of recognition, which specifies criteria for determining which 
primary rules have the status of law.60 Lawyers know, however, that there is 
a crucial intermediate step on the road to establishing that A has a legal 
right, and that is determining whether conditions C obtain. In the sidewalk 
case, the lawyers would not have been permitted to tell the client, “you 
                                                 
59
 As always, taking into account the multifaceted idea of a right as including a 
privilege, a claim-right, an immunity, and so on. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). For 
example, in the common law of torts a landowner has the “right” to leave her premises as 
she sees fit, and only warn users of the premises of hidden dangers. See, e.g., W. PAGE 
KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 60 (5th ed. 1984). In Hohfeldian terms, 
this right of the landowner is best construed as a privilege, correlated with no-right in a 
user of land to sue if the landowner fails to use reasonable care to make the premises safe. 
See Hohfeld, supra, at 747. 
60
 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994). 
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should say you fell across the street from the church,” if somehow they 
knew that the client had fallen on the sidewalk directly in front of the 
church. The scope of the legal rights and duties is clear; what is unclear, but 
determinative of the lawyers’ liability for discipline, are the murkier matters 
of the client’s truthfulness, the lawyers’ awareness of the facts, and the 
intent of the client and the lawyers. In general, much of the interest and 
challenge of representing clients in the real world pertains to investigation, 
discovery, and interpretation of factual evidence bearing on the client’s 
rights, as opposed to ascertaining the content of the law itself. It is in this 
connection that the ethical duties of lawyers are connected with the 
conditions under which we regard law as legitimate.  
 
In a book called Lawyers and Fidelity to Law,61 I argued because the 
law has the function of resolving social conflict and establishing a 
framework for cooperation with reference to collectively established norms, 
it deserves respect by citizens and ought not to be manipulated by lawyers 
to yield results that are contrary to the social settlement. In a review of that 
book, Ben Zipursky offered a hypothetical case to see whether, on this 
functional account, it is also the case that lawyers should have an ethical 
obligation to refrain from playing their usual lawyer games with facts.62 The 
hypothetical goes like this: 
 
Black lives in a house on Blackacre and White lives in a house on 
adjacent Whiteacre. Natural Rose Garden is a plot of land that is, 
roughly speaking, at the border between Blackacre and Whiteacre. 
Every year for the past several years, Black has snipped the valuable 
roses on Natural Rose Garden and sold them. White's newly adult 
daughter one day looks into the deed and decides that White owns the 
land on which the rose bushes sit. White sues Black for trespass and 
restitution and Black counterclaims on the ground that it is his land 
under his deed and also on adverse possession. Assuming that White's 
lawyer and Black's lawyer might have reasonably good arguments for 
their respective positions, each has a duty to represent her client well. 
We can all paint a spectrum of possible real underlying fact patterns 
here. On some of them, from a God's eye point of view, White is 
actually the one entitled to the land and the rose bushes in every sense 
of the term “entitled.” Yet there is no inconsistency between these being 
the real facts of the entitlement and Black's lawyer having a respectable 
litigation position, which he believes, that Black should prevail; and if 
he does then he must assert it. 
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To be clear at the outset, I share the evaluation of the vast majorities of 
lawyers who would conclude that there is no problem whatsoever with 
Black’s lawyer asserting a “respectable litigation position,” as long as it has 
adequate factual support. The objective perspective I am arguing for here is 
not that lawyers may advocate only positions that are the correct ones from 
the hypothetical God’s eye point of view. White may contend that the rose 
garden is really on her land, but she could be mistaken, and in any event 
Black may be able to succeed in an adverse possession argument if Black 
has openly and notoriously asserted title to the rose garden. Applicable 
procedural law requires the lawyer representing Black to ensure that the 
factual contentions made in support of Black’s position “have evidentiary 
support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”63 If the lawyer has 
reviewed the deed and discovered an ambiguity in the boundary between 
Black’s and White’s land, or if Black’s story of having regularly cut roses 
under a claim of right raises a plausible adverse possession claim, then the 
lawyer is acting ethically, even if the lawyer believes (and reasonably so) 
that the claim is not likely to prevail in the end.  
 
This seems like such an obvious conclusion that one may wonder why 
anyone is talking about this problem at all. The response is that, as I have 
been contending, specific ethical prescriptions for lawyers need to be 
grounded in more general democratic political considerations. Why, as a 
theoretical matter, is Black’s lawyer straightforwardly permitted to assert a 
losing claim? That is a harder question, and the answer one gives to that 
question will have considerable significance for the analysis of cases in 
which the ethical permissibility of the lawyer’s conduct is a closer call. In 
particular, one who believes that the law is best understood as a settlement 
of social controversy and a framework for cooperation in a pluralistic 
society is necessarily drawn to a picture of law as relatively determinate. 
Scott Shapiro nicely describes what he calls the General Logic of Planning 
(GLOP): Since the function of law is to rectify the situation of a community 
facing numerous problems whose solutions are controversial by establishing 
a social plan to guide and coordinate the actions of community members, it 
cannot be the case that ascertaining the content of law will require re-
engaging with the controversy that the law was meant to settle.64 With 
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 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
64
 SHAPIRO, supra note __, at 309-11. The reader should cross-reference this passage 
with Shapiro’s explanation of the circumstances of legality, id. at 170-73, which is very 
similar to the functional story set out in Lawyers and Fidelity to Law. See WENDEL, supra 
note __, at 89-98. 
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respect to the legal norms underlying the controversy over the rose garden, 
it is easy to understand the implications of GLOP for the Black-White 
dispute. There may be considerable controversy within a community over 
the respective rights of landowners, non-owners who make use of the land, 
potential purchasers of the property, and third parties such as lenders who 
must rely on publicly searchable title documents to determine the extent of 
their interest in the land of another.65 When can a bank or a potential 
purchaser rely on a deed to convey all the seller’s rights in the land, free of 
any claims of a potential adverse possessor (such as Black in the rose 
garden case)? One could imagine disagreement over the first-order question 
of what rights ought to be recognized, but since there is considerable social 
interest in having a clear and stable framework of property rights to 
facilitate sales of land and lending to finance land acquisition, the law 
establishes criteria for recognizing the interests of someone like Black. A 
party failing to satisfy those criteria has no interest in the rose garden. 
GLOP requires that these legal norms exclude reference to the 
considerations that otherwise might give Black more extensive rights.66 
Otherwise the law would not be capable of fulfilling its social function of 
underwriting stable expectations by creating a publicly accessible plan. 
 
Shapiro does not talk much about the ethical obligations of lawyers, but 
I have argued that the standard conception of legal ethics – in which 
lawyers have an excuse for violating ordinary moral prohibitions on 
harming others in certain ways – can be defended on a similar functional 
account. The social plan creates legal entitlements and, since specialized 
advice is generally necessary for ordinary people to understand the content 
and significance of their legal entitlements, the role of lawyers can be 
justified as the only way to make GLOP work in practice. But here is the 
problem: Ascertaining the existence and content of an entitlement is not just 
a matter of law, but an application of law to facts. White’s Entitlement (E), 
if there is one, to have the exclusive right to cut roses from the garden 
depends the law governing land transactions and adverse possession (L) 
along with myriad factual details (F) about the kind of use Black was 
making of the land, whether White knew about it, whether it was under a 
claim of right, and so on. Taking a page from Judge Learned Hand’s book, 
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  In Razian terms they function as exclusionary reasons. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
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one might represent legal entitlements using a formula: E = F + L. The 
social settlement or plan, upon which GLOP is premised, is not a function 
solely of L, but of F + L. I have argued that lawyers act unethically by 
abusing, manipulating, or planning around the law,67 but because the 
analytic linchpin of this position is the idea of client entitlements, and if it is 
the case that E = F + L, then lawyers act unethically by abusing, 
manipulating, or planning around factual evidence.  
 
One obvious response – one that I cautiously tried out in Lawyers and 
Fidelity to Law – is that the law creates not only substantive entitlements, 
such as the right to acquire title to land by adverse possession, but also 
procedure entitlements, which permit clients (through their agents, lawyers) 
to assert positions in litigation that are based on something short of the 
applicable standard of proof, such as “more likely than not” in most civil 
cases.68 The familiar Rule 11 standard requires lawyers only to ascertain 
that there is evidentiary support for factual contentions, not that the 
contentions will ultimately be vindicated at trial.69 The trouble with that 
response, as Zipursky pointed out, is that it leads to a regress. According to 
GLOP (and my view about the function of law), entitlements are supposed 
to guide action.70 Shapiro’s planning theory imagines people disagreeing 
about whether they ought, all things considered, to be permitted to do 
something or whether it ought to be prohibited. The rule of law, as a 
political ideal, requires that legal norms be general, i.e. stated in the form of 
rules, not simply the resolution of disagreement on a case-by-case basis.71 
But general norms necessarily require judgment to apply to particular 
cases.72 This observation about the indeterminacy of rules already creates 
some problems for GLOP – problems I attempted to address by relying on 
an interpretive community to regulate interpretive judgments.73 There might 
be a sufficient degree of objectivity in judgments concerning the content of 
law to satisfy GLOP, but all this determinacy might be undone by the 
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indeterminacy of facts. Relying on procedural entitlements to present 
dubious evidence, short of outright perjury, only compounds the problem. 
The entitlement does not stabilize the social plan at all, but introduces new 
uncertainty about the existence of legal entitlements, to the extent they 
depend on some fact being the case. 
 
As applied to legal ethics, the client’s legal entitlements set the bounds 
of the law that constrain the lawyer’s ethically permissible actions (under 
the traditional maxim, “zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law”). I 
have sought to establish that the law provides exclusionary reasons for 
action, both for citizens and for lawyers, and thus lawyers have an ethical 
justification for the actions they take in the course of representing clients. 
But if my position is that a client has a procedural entitlement equivalent, in 
essence, to “throw it up against the wall and see if it sticks,” the bounds of 
the law do not provide any real constraint on permissible advocacy. That is, 
the appeal to procedural entitlements simply collapses what is supposed to 
be a modified, moderate version of the standard conception of legal ethics 
into the traditional standard conception, in which a lawyer is ethically 
licensed to do pretty much whatever he or she can get away with in the 
course of representing a client.74 As Zipursky rightly notes,  
 
the efficacy of substantive law in shaping conduct, shaping 
responsibility allocation, and envisioning outcomes we are trying to 
realize as a society is obviously curtailed when individuals manage to 
defeat legal accountability after the fact, and certainly when they are 
able to predict their ability to defeat legal accountability.75   
 
It nevertheless strikes most lawyers as utterly implausible to deny that 
lawyers have a legal and an ethical right, and perhaps even a duty, to bring 
any factual claim that is likely to favor their client’s position, as long as it 
has enough factual support to get over the Rule 11 threshold. Thus, the 
challenge is to square the circle, and establish the right kind of connection 
between the democratic foundations of the account of law and legal ethics 
defended by Dare, Markovits, Shapiro, and myself, and the duties lawyers 
do have, and ought to have, with respect to facts. I believe it may be 
possible, and the arguments in Section IV will try to establish this 
connection, but before taking on this task with respect to civil litigation, a 
brief detour will be necessary to explain why criminal defense 
representation is a special case.  
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C.   Arguing for False Inferences. 
 
One of the central issues in the ethics of criminal defense advocacy is 
whether it is permissible to construct a narrative out of bits of evidence that 
are themselves true, but which lead the factfinder to draw an inference that 
is false. Consider an example from a case handled by John Mitchell, from 
the famous Subin-Mitchell debate on the criminal defense lawyer’s 
responsibilities. 76 A person is stopped on suspicion of shoplifting after 
leaving a store with a Christmas-tree ornament. As the manager is talking to 
her, someone inside the store calls out “there’s a fire!” and the manager has 
to go back inside. When he comes back out, the alleged shoplifter is still 
there, standing on the sidewalk. She agrees to be searched and the manager 
discovers that she has $10 in her pocket. In the actual case the client 
admitted to her lawyer (Mitchell) that she intended to steal the item,77 so 
there is no question that any story ending with “therefore, my client could 
not have intended to steal the ornament” is false. Nevertheless, at trial, the 
defense lawyer uses these bits of data to argue that the defendant could not 
possibly have intended to steal the ornament. Why, if she had the intent to 
steal, would she have been hanging around on the sidewalk after the fire 
alarm? And why, if she had the money to purchase the ornament, would she 
have risked stealing it?  
 
Another well-known example comes from an ethics opinion of the 
Michigan State Bar.78 I have embellished it only a little: A man is charged 
with assault, based on the victim’s report that he was hit over the head with 
a blunt object and robbed at midnight near an automated teller machine. The 
accused retains an attorney and admits to the attorney that he committed the 
robbery. In a twist, however, the defendant tells his lawyer that the robbery 
occurred at 2:00 a.m. The victim apparently was mixed up about the time 
since, after all, the defendant hit him over the head and stole his watch. As 
luck would have it, the defendant was playing poker at midnight with a 
priest, a rabbi, and the president of the local bank, all of whom have an 
unblemished reputation in the community for honesty and integrity. The 
attorney’s investigator talked to all three poker buddies and they were all 
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certain that they were playing poker at midnight with the defendant. The 
attorney believes that if she introduces the testimony of the three friends, 
the jury will believe them and conclude that the prosecution has not proved 
its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Is it ethical to put the friends on the 
stand to testify, given that the defendant has admitted that he committed the 
robbery?  
 
Almost every practicing lawyer with whom I have discussed this case 
believes there would be nothing wrong with putting the friends on the stand, 
even though the purpose of their testimony is to persuade the jury of 
something inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant. In fact, it can be hard 
to get lawyers to see what could possibly be wrong with calling the poker 
buddies and eliciting their testimony. In ordinary life, however, we could 
regard it as deceptive to tell a story “made up of truth” that was intended to 
lead the listener to draw a false inference. Many years ago when I was 
teaching this case in an ethics seminar I asked the students to give examples 
of incidents from their own lives in which the speaker used bits of truth to 
persuade another to draw a false conclusion. They responded with the 
following stories: 
 
Student A lived just outside the city limits while attending high school 
in town. His teacher asked him why his paper was not finished on time 
and he replied, “I was out of town.” He was home the whole time, but 
his home was “out of town.” 
 
Student B’s mother asked him whether he took out the trash. He 
responded, “The trash is outside on the sidewalk, mom.” Actually 
Student B was feeling lazy so he threatened to beat up his little brother 
if he did not take out the trash. 
 
Student C was asked why she had not attended class yesterday. “I was 
sick,” she said. She was indeed sick, but two days ago. Yesterday she 
was sleeping off a hangover.  
 
All of these statements are either evasions of the question or outright 
lies when considered in the context of the conclusion a reasonable person 
would draw in the context of the conversation. That is not to say that they 
would rise to the level of criminal perjury. In Bronston v. United States,79 
the Supreme Court held that the federal perjury statute as not violated by 
making literally true statements, even if uttered with an intent to deceive. 
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The witness in Bronston gave the following testimony before a grand jury: 
 
Q: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? 
 
A: No, sir. 
 
Q: Have you ever? 
 
A: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.80 
 
The witness intended to avoid revealing the present existence of a 
personal Swiss bank account. The Court of Appeals had held the statement 
to be a “lie by negative implication,”81 but the Supreme Court said part of 
the prosecutor’s job was to be alert to these sorts of verbal games and ask 
follow-up questions where necessary: “If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s 
responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the 
mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary 
examination.”82 While the Court’s statement might be a true statement 
about skilful lawyering, it is non-responsive to the argument that the 
testimony was false. If the purpose behind the perjury statute is to protect 
the integrity of the adversary system, it should not matter that one of the 
lawyers failed to notice an evasion by the witness and follow up with a 
more specific question. The witness lied, period, just as the students in their 
self-reported examples lied. 
 
To make the point somewhat more theoretically, a conversation is a 
cooperative enterprise, constituted by the shared expectations and purposes 
of the participants.83 The literal meaning of utterances is often fleshed out 
by the participants on the assumption that the speaker is oriented toward 
some common purpose.84 That common purpose need not necessarily be 
conveying factual information. Joking banter, bickering, and flirting, for 
example, have purposes different from information-directed conversations. 
Nevertheless, the norms governing conversation reflects the mutual 
dependence of the participants on the cooperation of one another in order to 
achieve a common purpose.85 A speaker may therefore be able to exploit the 
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expectations of other participants to convey a message that may not literally 
be untrue, but which has the effect of a literally untrue utterance. The 
examples given by my students show that manipulating what Paul Grice 
calls the rules of conversational implicature can be just as much a deception 
as a literal untruth.  
 
I am well aware – and mostly persuaded – by the standard response 
given by lawyers to this apparent moral dilemma.86 The criminal justice 
system cannot resort to any means to ascertain the truth. Even if torture 
were a reliable method of getting at truth, a decent society would not permit 
the police to put a suspect on the rack to find out the truth about a crime. 
While torture is an extreme example, other practices suggest that truth is not 
the only value that matters in the criminal justice system. In the U.S. (as 
well as in most common law countries) the accused cannot be compelled to 
take the stand and testify against himself.87 The prosecution has the burden 
of proof, which means the state bears the risk of non-persuasion – if the 
prosecution does not introduce sufficient evidence of guilt, the defendant is 
acquitted. The burden of proof is set at a very high threshold, “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” which means (roughly) that a jury must believe in the 
defendant's guilt with the same level of certainty they would require with 
respect to another extremely important decision. All of these procedural 
protections, which ensure that the government does not abuse its power, that 
innocent people are not wrongfully convicted of crimes, and that persons 
accused of crimes are treated fairly and with dignity, do not exist in a 
vacuum. Abstract rights require flesh-and-blood people to administer them. 
Judges and jurors make decisions about the law and the facts, respectively, 
but defense lawyers are also required in order to assert the defendant's 
rights. How better in this case to assert the defendant's right to hold the state 
to its high burden of proof than to introduce evidence inconsistent with 
guilt?  
 
Suppose for the sake of discussion that the client admitted to her lawyer 
that she intended to steal the ornament. Of course the lawyer would not be 
allowed to making a closing argument to the jury that includes the 
statement, “My client did not intend to steal the goods.” That would be a 
direct lie. When it comes to telling a story that is inconsistent with the 
client’s statement that she intended to steal the item, however, most 
criminal defense lawyers would argue that it is permissible deception, 
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justified as the only way to give practical effect to the defendant’s right to 
have guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, with the burden of proof 
resting squarely on the prosecution. In order to vindicate the defendant’s 
right, her advocate must be able not only to argue that the prosecution’s 
story is untrue, but also to tell a story of her own, inconsistent with the 
defendant’s guilt. Juries are persuaded by stories, not by bland denials of 
the facts as recounted by the prosecution. A defense lawyer cannot be 
limited simply to nitpicking the prosecution’s case, because isolated bits of 
evidence do not carry meaning and therefore cannot persuade. Persuasion is 
a meaning-making process, and meaning is conveyed by assembling events 
into a coherent story that has direction, or a purpose.  
 
In Mitchell’s example, the defense lawyer would practically be talking 
gibberish if she simply stated to the jury, “The state did not prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” It would not be much better to assert the facts 
blandly without arguing for an interpretation of the facts that is inconsistent 
with the defendant’s guilt, such as: “My client had $10 in her pocket; she 
didn’t run when the manager went back inside.” This would be a truthful 
statement of the evidence, but it would not mean much unless the 
implications of the evidence were laid out for the jury. The only intelligible 
way to present that kind of defense would be to connect the dots, as it were, 
by telling a story: “Now, if my client intended to steal the item, wouldn’t 
she have taken off as soon as the manager went inside to deal with the fire? 
The fact that she waited for him to return suggests that it was just an 
innocent mistake. That has to be the right explanation, considering she had 
enough money in her pocket to pay for the property, too.” The implication 
of that story is false – the client admitted intending to steal the property – 
but the defense lawyer must be permitted to tell the client’s story as a way 
of asserting the client’s right to, as lawyers say, put the state to its proof. As 
a matter of human psychology, people understand events and persuade each 
other by telling stories.88 Denying the lawyer permission to tell a story 
inconsistent with guilt would undercut the client’s right to have her guilt 
established at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
To make a somewhat deeper point, which may strike some readers as 
sophistry, a lawyer might deny that the story told on behalf of the client is 
false, because truth and falsity in legal narratives is not simply a matter of 
bland factual reporting – did the client steal the goods or not? Rather, a 
story told at trial is part of a broader narrative in which the meaning of the 
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law is elaborated, including such matters as whether it is legitimate to 
punish this person for this offense. The law’s claim to our allegiance 
depends on its being a way of understanding that “rings true” for its 
subjects. Narratives not only constitute the reality for the individuals whose 
stories are told at trial, but they also constitute the very idea of justice. 
Understood in this way, the conclusion of the defense lawyer’s story is not 
“my client didn’t steal the item” but “my client does not deserve 
punishment.” Factual data are parts of the narrative but so are explicit or 
implicit claims about desert, blame, responsibility, excuse, and other 
normative notions. A story is believed or not if it makes the right kind of 
sense of both the facts and the values implicated by an event. “[N]arrative is 
a mode of discourse that takes directly into account the normative elements 
on which law is based – the existence of a legitimate, canonical state of 
things that has been complicated by some human action in some particular 
context or setting.”89 Specifically with regard to a criminal trial, the 
discourse of the participants is the rhetoric of blaming, which is aimed at 
identifying and restoring the right relationships among members of a 
community.90 The community therefore creates and sustains itself through 
judgments of blame made on the basis of stories meant to justify 
punishment or mercy.  
 
The institutional setting of the case, with the defendant’s rights and the 
requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, 
distinguishes it from the case where the student lied to his mother about 
taking out the trash. It therefore provides the lawyer with a way to 
redescribe the case as “not lying, but protecting the defendant’s rights 
through legally permissible means.” Employing the procedures of a 
legitimate system to enact a narrative is different, in morally relevant terms, 
from lying in ordinary life. This vindication of the defense lawyer's role 
does not permit a lawyer to do anything at all. It is quite clear that lawyers 
may not participate in introducing false evidence or making false statements 
to the court. The rules of professional conduct provide, for example, that 
“[a] lawyer shall not falsify evidence [or] counsel or assist a witness to 
testify falsely”91 and “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement 
of fact or law to a tribunal.”92 In the Michigan case, however, the 
defendant's lawyer would argue that she is not trying to establish the truth of 
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the proposition, “My client did not commit the robbery.” Rather, the lawyer 
is trying to persuade the jury of the truth of this proposition: “The 
prosecutor did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my client 
committed the robbery.” The defense lawyer will not state in her closing 
argument that her client did not commit the robbery, only that the 
prosecution’s evidence does not suffice to prove the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The lawyer therefore changes the relevant 
description of the situation, from lie or deception to "protecting the 
defendant's rights."93  
 
III. THE POLITICAL ETHICS OF LAWYER GAMES. 
 
Lawyers are often accused of being wrongdoers, in moral terms, even 
though they act properly as judged by the standards of professional ethics – 
the state disciplinary codes and other aspects of the law governing lawyers. 
Daniel Markovits puts the point quite starkly by saying that lawyers lie and 
cheat.94 Without necessarily endorsing his claim that these vices are 
“inscribed in the genetic structure” of the adversary system,95 or his 
idiosyncratic definitions of lying and cheating,96 I hope that some readers 
have the intuition that at least one of the cases in Section II could be 
described in moral terms as lying or cheating. The core of these moral ideas 
is obtaining an unfair advantage through trickery or manipulation, and 
something like telling a half-truth to avoid warranted punishment or 
manufacturing a story consistent with the defendant’s liability could be seen 
as an attempt to work around the rules of a practice that has as one of its 
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ends the determination of factual truth. Nevertheless, lawyers believe they 
are justified in doing these things, not only according to the standards of 
professional ethics but also in moral terms. If an observer called them liars 
or cheats, lawyers would patiently explain that, not only are these actions 
permitted or required by professional ethical standards (which are neither 
here nor there from the point of view of morality), but are morally justified 
as well. Why? Well, that gets into the heartland of the debate in theoretical 
legal ethics, and in particular whether the best way to understand the source 
of lawyers’ ethical obligations is in terms of generally applicable moral 
considerations, such as loyalty to clients and human dignity, or instead 
values that are more naturally thought of as part of political morality.97 It 
also gets into the specific issue considered here, namely, whether the 
relationship between truth-related values and legal ethics should be 
conceived of in objective or subjective terms.  
 
A.   Luban: Human Dignity. 
 
The first position to be considered in this section is located decisively 
on the side of ordinary – which is to say, not a special kind of political – 
morality, and also the subjective approach to the relationship between truth 
and legal ethics. David Luban has argued that the ethical obligations of 
lawyers are ultimately derived from the client’s human dignity.98 The value 
of dignity, in turn, should not be understood metaphysically, but as a 
property of how individuals relate to each other and to institutions of 
collective self-governance. As Luban emphasized in an influential critique 
of the standard conception, autonomy is a thin and rather unattractive basis 
for an ethical theory.99 Dignity, by contrast, is something that really matters. 
The difference is that, while autonomy is about what people may do, dignity 
is about who people are – it is essentially connected with their subjectivity 
and thus the ground of their personhood. Autonomy, says Luban, is a 
“truncated view of humanity and human experience,” which reduces the 
essence of human personhood to will and the capacity to choose; human 
dignity, on the other hand, means honoring someone’s being, which 
transcends the choices they make.100 To fail to treat another with dignity is 
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therefore to treat him or her as a non-person. 
 
Luban adopts Alan Donagan’s understanding of what it means for a 
person, or a legal system, to treat another with dignity: “[O]ne fails to 
respect [another’s] dignity as a human being if on any serious matter one 
refuses even provisionally to treat his or her testimony about it as being in 
good faith.”101 From this it follows that a lawyer serves as an instrument or 
technology that enables people to tell their stories.102 Again we see the 
familiar pattern of justification – it is a redescription of what seems like 
lying or cheating as something else. Various forms of trickery with facts 
may look like lying or cheating, but they are actually more appropriately 
described as “assisting the client in making his her voice heard by a 
powerful decisionmaker.” On this account, there is a clear answer to the 
objective vs. subjective question: A lawyer’s ethical obligations are not 
dependent upon what is the case, but turn instead on the story the client 
wishes to tell. This is an attractive position when several conditions are 
satisfied: (1) the client’s story is truthful, (2) it is one that deserves to be 
heard by courts or other institutional actors, and (3) the lawyer is doing 
nothing more than clarifying, amplifying, or otherwise making the client’s 
story more persuasive, while remaining faithful to the underlying factual 
account given by the client. But the dignity and storytelling-based approach 
runs into difficulties when one of these conditions is not satisfied. How 
would a dignity-based approach to ethics handle the sidewalk case, for 
example, where the lawyers altered the client’s story? The client obtained a 
benefit in the form of a legal right to sue the sidewalk owner, but the 
lawyer’s conduct cannot be defended as an instance of telling the client’s 
story. A lawyer would not fail to treat the client with dignity by refraining 
from altering her testimony, although it might be a failure to treat her story 
at least provisionally as being in good faith if the lawyer was too quick to 
assume that the client was not simply confused about the location.   
 
The application of the value of dignity to these cases is important 
because, in practice, the client’s dignity as such may be less important than 
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the client’s interests. In other words, a dignity-based approach begins to 
resemble the standard conception of legal ethics. Luban appears to slide 
subtly into the unmodified standard conception when he discusses a case, 
borrowed from William Simon,103 in which the client was arrested while 
placing a stolen television in the back seat of his car and charged with 
possession of stolen property. An element of the crime was of course 
knowing the television was stolen. The lawyer argued to the jury that 
someone who knew the television to be stolen would have put it in the 
trunk, rather than driving around with stolen property in plain view in the 
back seat. The lawyer knew, however, that the defendant did not have a key 
to the trunk. The fact that the defendant put the television in the back seat 
actually had nothing to do with his mens rea, but it helped make a strong 
case for acquittal. As Luban rightly notes, most lawyers would justify the 
conduct here by pointing out that if there is evidence supporting an innocent 
explanation of the defendant's actions, there is reasonable doubt and the 
defendant is entitled to an acquittal:  
 
All the lawyer has done is dramatize the reasonable doubt instead of 
arguing for it in an abstract manner. That seems like an entirely 
legitimate way to make the case for reasonable doubt. Every litigator 
knows that it takes a story to beat a story. Arguing abstractly for 
reasonable doubt will never sake a jury's preconceptions.104 
 
This argument is quite powerful, but it fits uncomfortably with Luban’s 
general approach. For Luban, the essence of human dignity is subjectivity – 
having a story of one's own to tell. The defendant's actual story is that he 
did not have a key to the trunk. The lawyer's embellishment, arguing that 
the defendant must not have known the television was stolen because 
otherwise he would have put it in the trunk, is a great story but it is not the 
defendant's story.  
 
Luban ends up falling back on an argument that defense lawyers may be 
morally permitted to respect human dignity indirectly as well as directly. 
Direct respect for the value of dignity, as he has defined it, requires being a 
voice for the client's actual story. Indirect respect, on the other hand, means 
participating in a process that presumes innocence and sets a high burden 
that the prosecution must meet to obtain a conviction. "[T]he advocate 
defends her client's human dignity either directly, by telling his story, or 
indirectly, by demonstrating that a good faith story of innocence could be 
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constructed from the evidence."105 This is a reasonable approach to the 
relationship between dignity and the procedures of the adversary system, 
but notice that it offloads a great deal of the normative pressure onto the 
system. This is something about which Luban has elsewhere been quite 
skeptical.106 He is wary of institutional solutions to ethical problems given 
the frequency with which institutions have enabled serious wrongdoing.107 
In other contexts, such as the case of Manhattan prosecutor Daniel Bibb, 
who allegedly contrived to lose a case in which he believed the defendant to 
be innocent, Luban has preferred the option of an individual acting directly 
on ethical concerns to the alternative of working through procedures and a 
chain of command.108 So it is a bit surprising to see the idea of an 
institutional justification for a lawyer’s conduct serving as the analytical 
bridge between the value of human dignity and the lawyer’s permission to 
tell a false story. 
 
On this institutional approach, the moral significance of representing 
clients and telling their stories comes not from the lawyer-client 
relationship, which may appropriately be characterized in ordinary moral 
terms, but from the way in which the lawyer establishes and maintains the 
right kind of relationship between the client and the state. The lawyer 
contributes to a mode of governance that has moral value. This approach to 
governance does have a connection with human dignity, but it is a type of 
dignity that has a distinctive role in political ethics. Jeremy Waldron puts it 
this way: 
 
[L]aw is a mode of governing people that treats them with respect, as 
though they had a view or perspective of their own to present on the 
application of [a] norm to their conduct and situation. Applying a norm 
to a human individual is not like deciding what to do about a rabid 
animal or a dilapidated house. It involves paying attention to a point of 
view and respecting the personality of the entity one is dealing with. As 
such, it embodies a crucial dignitarian idea – respecting the dignity of 
those who whom the norms are applied as being capable of explaining 
themselves.109 
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Luban would probably not be hostile to understanding the value of dignity 
in this way, as a property of a relationship between persons and institutions 
of government. In an excellent chapter on the legal ethics of Lon Fuller,110 
he reads Fuller as proposing that the distinctive morality of the “law job” of 
representing clients can be understood as contributing to the functioning of 
a system that has as its characteristic end the governance of people through 
means that respect their dignity.111 Echoing Waldron’s elaboration of the 
relationship between dignity and the legal system, Luban reads Fuller as 
grounding the rule of law on the moral foundation of “promoting the self-
determining agency of the governed,”112 that is, the dignity of citizens.  
 
No one can fully exercise self-determining agency if one of the means 
to the exercise of agency is the assertion of a legal entitlement, or the 
employment of legal procedures, that requires a greater degree of expertise 
in the law than can be expected of an ordinary citizen without specialized 
training.113 Consider the rose garden example. White may believe she has a 
right to exclude Black from cutting roses in her garden, but an effective 
assertion of that right will quickly enmesh her in the intricacies of deed 
interpretation and the law of adverse possession. Dignity in the sense of 
being treated by the state as a person entitled to respect requires that some 
legal decisionmaker take White’s story seriously in consider whether Black 
has a right to cut roses. This, in turn, requires that White have a lawyer who 
takes her story seriously and does not refuse to present it because she, the 
lawyer, disbelieves it without good reason. One of the conditions for the 
legitimacy of the decision ultimately rendered, concerning the respective 
rights of White and Black to harvest the roses, is that both parties have had 
an opportunity to tell their stories without undue interference. As always, 
however, a great deal rests on the word “undue,” for lawyers acting on 
behalf of clients are not permitted to present false evidence,114 falsify 
evidence or contrive to have others testify falsely,115 or ask witnesses to 
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refrain from giving information.116 In other words, the rules of professional 
conduct do not envision lawyers as merely storytellers, but as participants in 
a process that has as one of its ends the search for truth. The subjective 
perspective remains powerful, however, and the next theoretical perspective 
on legal ethics goes even farther than Luban does in its insistence that 
lawyers function as passive conduits for their clients’ stories.   
 
 
B.   Markovits: Legitimacy and the Lawyer’s Integrity. 
 
Legitimacy and the rule of law are lurking in the background of much of 
Luban’s work, but they are front and center in the complex, sometimes 
bewildering, and always surprising approach to legal ethics recently 
defended by Daniel Markovits in his book, A Modern Legal Ethics.117 For 
the purposes of this discussion we can set aside some of the most 
provocative aspects of his work, including his insistence that lawyers bear a 
separate obligation of justification in first-personal terms even while being 
impartially justified when the act as adversary advocates, and his “tragic” 
conclusion that conditions, particularly professional insularity, no longer 
exist that would be conducive to developing the lawyerly virtues (and 
would be so conducive if they did exist). Instead I will concentrate on his 
exploration of the connection between political legitimacy and the 
justification for the things lawyers do in the course of representing clients in 
litigation. 
 
Markovits and I are in complete agreement that the law has “a 
distinctively political kind of authority” over citizens, which derives from 
the capacity of the law to sustain a stable framework for collective 
government, notwithstanding the incompatible interests, and plurality of 
reasonable moral commitments, of individuals.118 We also agree that 
politics does not really attempt to resolve disagreement but merely seeks to 
“establish a provisional, although hopefully renewable, holding pattern.”119 
We differ, however, at the point where he perceives a significant gap in 
existing accounts of political legitimacy and the authority of legal 
institutions. For Markovits, it is not enough for citizens to agree on abstract 
propositions concerning the processes of government. Rather, citizens must 
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also “come to take ownership of political outcomes.”120 This requires an 
affective engagement in actual political practice, not only abstract 
understanding. He really means it when he says political engagement must 
be affective. Politics for Markovits is not merely a technology to coordinate 
individuals’ pre-political ends and realize the benefits of stability and 
cooperation; it is, additionally, responsive to an inner need for belonging.121 
The institutions and procedures of the legal system have value in the 
distinctive register of political morality because they offer the opportunity 
for citizens to become transformed through engagement. Individuals start 
off with mere preferences or brute demands, but these interests become 
reconstituted as rights through participation in the political process. It is 
worth quoting Markovits’s language here, to show that he contemplates 
something mysterious and almost metaphysical. He says participatory 
engagements in the political process “penetrate the ideals and preferences of 
the parties in ways in which nonparticipants cannot share, so that the parties 
come, through their engagements with the legal process, to take ownership 
of the resolutions that the process produces, including even resolutions that 
they continue to dispute on the merits.”122 The transformation is not merely 
linguistic, although it is true that the discourse of legal rights is semantically 
distinct from the discourse of interests and demands. The transformation is 
much deeper, because parties exit the dispute-resolution process oriented 
differently toward one another – no longer as adversaries but as co-
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participants in a process that constitutes the disputing individuals with 
respect to each other as citizens. 
 
Leave aside for now the obvious question whether most citizens in a 
modern, large-scale, pluralistic democracy really do have a deep, inner need 
for belonging, or whether they are content to be left more or less alone by 
the institutions of government. (Or whether clients are not interested in 
engagement or transformation, but simply want to maximize the realization 
of their pre-political ends. In the rose garden case, Black may be seeking to 
transform his brute demand into a claim of right, or he may simply intend to 
cause enough of a headache for White that she decides it is worth giving 
Black a license to cut the flowers. Rather than being transformative, the 
procedures of adversarial litigation may be nothing more than a weapon 
with which to club others into submission.) However, Markovits’s claim is 
conceptual, not empirical, so it is irrelevant whether the attitudes of our 
fellow citizens are in fact as described. He argues that legitimacy requires 
that transformative engagement at least be available to citizens who demand 
it.123 This is the connection between legitimacy and legal ethics. In order for 
people to participate in the process of resolving disputes, they need the 
assistance of experts in the sometimes technical process of dispute 
resolution. Because the process of dispute resolution has to “penetrate their 
ideals and preferences” and work a transformation of their attitudes toward 
other parties to the dispute, however, the interposition of a professional 
agent cannot create too much of a distance between the parties and the 
process. The beliefs and interests with which the parties begin the dispute 
must be fed in, more or less as they hold them, as inputs into the process. 
The role of a lawyer is thus to serve as a faithful voice or mouthpiece (in the 
good sense) who will convey the story told by a client to official 
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decisionmakers.124 This role brings political legitimacy down from the 
“wholesale” to the “retail” level as individual citizens with specific disputes 
submit them to adjudication. Since participation in the process “transforms 
brute demands into assertions of right,”125 the lawyer performs a kind of 
mediating role between the private language of the client’s “brute demands” 
and the language of rights which speaks from the perspective of the political 
community as a whole.  
 
Crucially, in order for the lawyer to perform the mediating role assigned 
by democratic theory, the lawyer must exercise what Markovits calls 
negative capability.126 This concept, which he borrows from the poet John 
Keats, suggesting receptiveness to the world and the non-imposition of 
one’s own preconceptions upon experience – Keats described it as “capable 
of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason.”127 A lawyer must not exercise any judgment of her 
own; she must “efface herself, or at least her personal beliefs about the 
claims and causes that she argues.”128 One might object that the very last 
thing the world needs is negatively capable lawyers. A depressing parade of 
legal ethics fiascoes, including the participation of lawyers in the savings 
and loan crisis and the collapse of Enron,129 have been caused by lawyers 
who remain content with half knowledge and fail to reach after fact and 
reason. Given Markovits’s commitment to transformative engagement, 
however, it is essential for him that lawyers not serve as filters or 
gatekeepers between their clients’ own conception of their interests and the 
process of dispute resolution that transforms these interests into rights that 
are constituted by the political community. He therefore represents the 
purest form of the subjective conception of the relationship between 
lawyers and truth. Ethical lawyering demands rigorous abstention from 
passing on the truth of one’s client’s story. The objective point of view – 
what I have been calling the perspective of what is the case – is, for 
Markovits, an impediment to legitimacy.  
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Moreover, many of the cases we have been discussing involve conduct 
that is the antithesis of negative capability, yet it is what practicing lawyers 
believe is required of them. The witness preparation memos in the asbestos 
litigation, for example, is anything but “being in uncertainties, Mysteries, 
[and] doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason”130 – it is, in 
fact, removing the possibility of apparent uncertainty from a witness’s 
testimony (“you had NO IDEA ASBESTOS WAS DANGEROUS when 
you were working around it”) and taking a quite confident stance regarding 
the identity of the manufacturers. Similarly, the lawyers in the sidewalk 
case are not effacing themselves and maintaining no identity of their own, 
allowing the “ordinarily mute” perspective of the client to have a voice.131 
A better description would be that the lawyers have drowned out their 
client’s voice with their own professional identity as zealous pursuers of 
what they believe their client’s ends to be – i.e. making some money in a 
personal injury lawsuit. The best description of their representation is not 
negative capability but imputing the ends of the legal system to their client, 
something for which lawyers are frequently and justly criticized.132 
Although contra Markovits, I find negative capability to be an unappealing 
ideal for lawyers, a bit more of it might be just the thing for lawyers who 
represent clients in litigation. 
 
C.   Hazard & Remus: Autonomy, Skepticism, and Legitimacy. 
 
Whatever one thinks about negative capability as a virtue for lawyers, it 
is clear that Markovits’s vision of legal ethics gives no direct responsibility 
to lawyers to ensure the justice of outcomes. Legitimacy, yes, but not 
justice. Like Rawls, who insisted against Habermas that justice is the first 
virtue of political institutions,133 many theoretical legal ethics scholars 
contend that justice should be the foundation of the normative structure of 
the lawyer’s professional ethical role. William Simon, for example, 
criticizes the standard conception of legal ethics for focusing on the hazy 
ideal of long-run justice, and relying on invisible-hand mechanisms for its 
achievement, while ignoring the involvement of lawyers in immediate, 
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palpable injustices.134 Lawyers, at best, contribute only indirectly to justice, 
and for Simon this is a reason to reject the standard conception. But 
legitimacy continues to have considerable attraction as the foundational 
value in legal ethics, and it forms the basis for a defense of the standard 
conception by Geoffrey Hazard and Dana Remus. 
 
One of the distinctive features of the Hazard/Remus approach is its 
reliance on epistemological skepticism. “The assumption that lawyers, 
judges, and jurors can access the objective truth of a litigated legal dispute 
is incorrect and unwarranted,” they write.135 This commitment draws a 
sharp contrast between their position and those of Simon, Judge Marvin 
Frankel, and Harry Subin,136 who are all quite explicitly anti-skeptics. If one 
believes it is possible to have “access to ultimate truth,” as Hazard and 
Remus put it,137 then one could demand, as a normative matter, that lawyers 
accept some responsibility for the justice of outcomes. If truth is 
unknowable by the parties’ lawyers, however, then by the Kantian ought-
implies-can principle,138 there can be no obligation to seek justice. (At least 
this is true if there is some necessary relationship between truth and justice, 
which surely there is; on any plausible account of legal justice, it depends 
on criteria such as desert and reciprocity,139 which depend, in turn, on what 
is factually true in the natural world concerning the relationships between 
people.) This is indeed the tack they take, but as they develop ethical 
principles for lawyers against the background of skepticism about truth, 
they are concerned not to allow lawyers to become cynical about their role. 
The foil for their argument seems to be a proponent of the unmodified 
standard conception, a lawyer who believes that, since truth and justice do 
not constrain ethically permissible advocacy, then anything goes. Hazard 
and Remus do not want the first principle of legal ethics to be undiluted 
zealous advocacy, and they begin by anchoring the lawyer’s ethical role in 
considerations of political legitimacy,140 so the issue to be explored is what 
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conception of legitimacy they rely upon that is not dependent upon truth. 
 
Their starting point is the recognition of the simultaneous existence of 
two features of a political community – namely, uncertainty (or conflict) 
and the need for a decision to be made about what should be done.141 The 
theme of their response to this dilemma is that political ethics generally, and 
legal ethics specifically, should be understood as a matter of doing 
something, not theorizing.142 It is a reflective, but necessarily also a 
practical activity of mediating between the interests of the individual and 
the community.143 It is also an activity situated within a temporally and 
spatially bound community. In the classical tradition, the practice through 
which need of a community for action notwithstanding conflict is pursued is 
rhetoric. Thus, an appealing solution to any community’s problems 
involving uncertainty, conflict, and the need for a decision can be found in 
the rhetorical practice of adversarial advocacy.144 They do not say this 
explicitly, but the implicit contrast suggested by their reliance on rhetoric 
instead of theoretical reasoning is between a practice aimed at doing 
something and a practice aimed at forming true beliefs. The implication 
seems to be that the concept of truth has little role to play in rhetoric: 
 
The assumption that lawyers, judges, and jurors can access the objective 
truth of a litigated legal dispute is incorrect and unwarranted. As an 
initial matter, and as Aristotle explains, uncertainty inheres in any 
context of “practical knowledge” – any context of human affairs.145 
 
The disharmony that can be expected in any diverse political community 
threatens the conditions under which truth can serve as the basis for 
political action.146 A legal system, and the ethics of actors within it, must be 
“rigidly constrained by limitations on law’s access to truth.”147 
 
Hazard and Remus are well aware of the criticism that has been leveled 
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at rhetoric since ancient times, which is that it is nothing more than the 
practice of making the true seem false and the false seem true.148 To this 
they reply, on the authority of Aristotle, that there is an ethics of rhetoric – 
there are good and bad uses to which the rhetorician’s art can be employed. 
They are correct to see this as a distinctive political ethical practice, not 
something with a precise analogue in ordinary moral life. The lawyer, as a 
rhetorician, is constrained by the idea of “procedural truth,” which is a kind 
of synthesis of the competing positions put forward by the parties.149 
Procedural truth is necessarily approximate,150 and is very likely based on a 
degree of certainty that is much lower than what would be required to 
certify a belief as true, as a matter of theoretical rationality.151 Objective 
truth is inaccessible. Approximate, procedural truth is the best we can do in 
a world characterized by uncertainty and conflict, and a good enough basis 
for governing a fractious society.  
 
The focus on procedural truth risks obscuring the central role that the 
community plays in the ethics of rhetoric. As James Boyd White shows, 
classical theorists of rhetoric are not pragmatists; there is a right way and a 
wrong way to seek to persuade another.152 In Sophocles’s play Philoctetes, 
Odysseus’s attempt at deceiving Philoctetes into giving the bow of Heracles 
to the Achaeans for their use in the conquest of Troy fails and leads to even 
more intransigence on Philoctetes’s part. White draws two lessons from the 
play. First, if attaining one’s ends requires the cooperation of others, then 
the only means of realizing those ends is to recognize the freedom and 
autonomy of others.153 Freedom and autonomy are aspects of human 
dignity, which is the foundational value in the ethics of advocacy defended 
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by Luban and Markovits, but they are talking about the dignity of the client. 
Sophocles, on White’s reading of his play, is foregrounding the dignity of 
the person to be persuaded, and reminding us that deception is also a 
violation of dignity, just as surely as failing to take one’s client’s story 
seriously. White’s second point is more general, far subtler, and centrally 
important to the argument of this paper: The conditions for pure means-ends 
rationality do not exist, because “social action requires community and . . . 
community can never be compelled.”154 Practical rationality, which Hazard 
and Remus rightly argue is characteristic of the legal process, is intrinsically 
communal; as I like to say, it proceeds from the standpoint of the first-
person plural.155 Interpreting and applying the law is a process of 
reconstructing what we have decided, as a political community, ought to be 
done about some social problem. That means respecting the freedom and 
equality of others who will be affected by some action purportedly under 
the justification of legality. The ethics of advocacy must be founded on the 
needs of the community, which include the implicit demand that all citizens 
make to be treated with respect. Rhetoric that merely aims at persuasion 
through flattery (as Socrates stigmatizes the arguments of the rhetorician in 
Gorgias) treats others as means to an end, and is therefore unethical.156 
 
The implication of this critique of rhetoric is that the Hazard/Remus 
argument proves too much. They are right to emphasize the uncertainties 
involved in political action. The parties have their own point of view, and 
lawyers, as their representatives, have only partial access to the truth that is 
independent of the parties’ points of view. They also concede that an 
advocate is not free to engage in the kind of cheap emotive appeals 
criticized by Socrates in Gorgias (which Stephen Colbert would call 
“truthiness”) or engage in deception like Odysseus’s scheme in Philoctetes; 
rather, the lawyer is “constrained by requirements that the narrative be 
based on a plausible version of the evidence and that it be informed by 
relevant substantive and procedural law,” as well as by prohibitions in the 
law governing lawyers on the use of perjured testimony and false 
evidence.157 Hazard and Remus also emphasize the meaning-making 
function of litigation, something very much rooted in classical 
understandings of rhetoric. The end of the litigation process is the 
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construction of “truths that are persuasive enough to facilitate judgment.”158 
It would seem to be that if objective truth is unknowable by anyone with 
only limited access to it, then a trial process is sure to consist of 
“untrustworthy arts of persuasion, by which [each lawyer] seeks to make his 
own case, even if it is the weaker one, appear to be stronger.”159 How can 
anything that results from this process be regarded as “persuasive enough to 
facilitate judgment”?  
 
One answer is that, as rhetoricians, Hazard and Remus are committed to 
a conception of ethical advocacy that does not violate the expectation of 
other members of the community that they not be deceived or manipulated. 
While this may be an empirical question, it seems plausible that most 
citizens are aware of the inaccessibility of objective truth to the parties and 
their lawyers, and are therefore tolerant of a system of pleading and 
procedure that permits lawyers to take positions based on something short 
of certainty. It does not follow, however, that active manipulation of the 
factual record (as in the sidewalk case) or indifference to the truth of 
testimony or documents offered as evidence, are consistent with the 
community’s ends.  
 
A different answer may be along the lines suggested by Markovits, 
namely, that the adversarial process must answer to the demand that it 
legitimate the application of law to the citizens affected by it. Citizens who 
are subject to the law may substantially accept the epistemological premises 
of the Hazard/Remus account. People may be perfectly well aware that no 
participant in the trial process has access to objective truth, and that the best 
we can expect is an approximation. At the same time, however, they do 
expect that the result of the trial process be something having to do with 
justice and the rule of law. Someone ought to be able to learn of the 
outcome of a legal proceeding, know a bit about the position of the parties 
in the dispute, and come away with the conclusion, “that makes sense.”160 
Not necessarily, “I agree,” but at least, “I see how that is a plausible 
resolution of the dispute, given the facts and the law.” In other words, the 
outcome has to be something that is intelligible as a contribution to a 
narrative about our community’s standards. The role of lawyers, on this 
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approach, would be to contribute to a process which results in a 
determination that rings true as a matter of the craft of legal reasoning. 
White describes an ideal pattern of justification of a legal decision, and 
while here is talking about an appellate judge, this passage suggests the way 
in which the craft of judging constrains the ethics of lawyering: 
 
The ideal judge would show that he had listened to the side he voted 
against and that he had felt the pull of the arguments both ways. The law 
that was made that way would comprise two opposing voices, those of 
the parties, in a work made by another, by the judge who had listened to 
both and had faced the conflict between them in an honest way.161 
 
The ethical principle for lawyers that can be derived from this account 
of the judicial process is this: The ability of a judge, or a legal system, to 
face social conflict in an honest way depends on the facts of the dispute 
being presented to decision-makers in a fundamentally honest way. That 
does not mean lawyers should aim directly at the truth, but it does mean 
there are reasons to disfavor the traditional, unmodified version of the 
standard conception, in which the value of truthfulness does not serve as a 
constraint on advocacy (beyond the rules prohibiting the use of false 
evidence). The unknowability of “ultimate truth,” in the sense of that which 
would be determined at trial after the presentation of evidence, does not 
relieve participants in a political process from an obligation to treat others 
non-manipulatively.  The arguments in the final section of this paper seek to 
show that the demand for legal legitimacy limits the permissibility of the 
game-playing with facts that lawyers believe to be permitted under the 
standard conception of legal ethics.  
 
IV. TRUTHFULNESS AND LEGITIMACY. 
 
The moral foundation of the law is the respect that is owed by all to 
their fellow citizens, whom they regard as free and equal. This liberal 
conception of value and of political ethics is the underpinning of the recent 
philosophical reconstruction of the standard conception of legal ethics – 
let’s call it the modified standard conception. The role of lawyer, according 
to Dare, Markovits, and others,162 can only be understood as part of an 
institutional response to the social problem that people disagree with one 
another, subscribe to a plurality of sometimes conflicting conceptions of 
human value, and are uncertain about empirical facts that bear on the 
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resolution of many matters, yet nevertheless still need to live in a stable, 
peaceful community with others. This institutional response in the United 
States has generally been understood in terms of a political tradition that 
emphasizes limitations on government power, decentralization of state 
power, and the importance of individual rights, which exists paradoxically 
in tension with pervasive demand for governmental responses to social 
problems such as discrimination, accidental injuries, environmental 
degradation, and economic dislocation.163 The older, unmodified standard 
conception of legal ethics is therefore interpreted to “endorse zealous 
advocacy of client’s causes, short of dishonesty, but without regard to the 
interests of justice in the particular case or broader societal concerns.”164  
 
The relationship between the value of truthfulness and the unmodified 
standard conception of legal ethics is thus one of skepticism or mistrust. 
Lawyers, as the representatives of individual citizens (or entities comprised 
of individuals), take on the point of view of the citizen, not the government 
or society as a whole. One reason they must be partisan is that lawyers do 
not have access to the truth of the matter, where “truth” here refers to both 
empirical knowledge about the natural world and knowledge about right 
conduct or justice.165 Another is that regimes of ex parte justice, where a 
litigant must appear before an official tribunal and give evidence concerning 
facts in dispute, have historically been subject to abuse.166 Permitting the 
parties to have their own lawyers, with duties of loyalty and confidentiality 
owed solely to the client, is a means to protect the rights of individual 
litigants from abuse by the state or other citizens.167 These attitudes toward 
truthfulness fit uncomfortably with the modified standard conception, 
however, which emphasizes the role of law, the legal system, and lawyers in 
contributing to a settlement of social controversy. If the unmodified 
standard conception describes a world of “adversarial legalism” where the 
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parties are pitted against one another, represented by zealous advocates, 
how does the modified standard conception imagine lawyers should act 
with respect to evidence and factual truth? 
 
At least one version of the modified standard conception relies upon at 
least a moderate degree of determinacy in law.168 Indeed, the law must be 
moderately determinate, or it could not fulfill its social function of standing 
in for the positions of the individuals who disagree or are in doubt as to 
what should be done. If clever lawyers could, under the guise of interpreting 
and applying legal rules in the course of advising their clients, re-introduce 
the contested positions the law was meant to resolve, the coordination and 
settlement function of the law would collapse. The modified standard 
conception opposes aggressive or abusive legal interpretation – what Tim 
Dare calls “hyper-zealous” representation.169 But that problem also extends 
to aggressive or abusive practices with respect to facts. Consider the 
conduct of the lawyers in the Texas asbestos case. One issue that may be in 
dispute in society is, what should be the extent of liability of various 
product manufacturers who marketed a defective product which caused 
occupational illnesses with long latency period, with the result that many 
people injured by exposure to these products cannot establish one element 
of a tort claim – factual causation – to a preponderance of evidence. 
Considerations of fairness and corrective justice may limit liability to those 
manufacturers whose products a tort plaintiff can identify. Why should 
Owens-Corning have to compensate someone injured by products marketed 
by Eagle Picher? In fact, with the exception of occasional outlier cases like 
Sindell,170 the tort system has generally refused to relax the requirement of 
showing causation in these so-called indeterminate defendant cases.171 One 
could imagine a contrary view as a matter of justice, but that is the point – 
reasonable people could disagree about what should be done about this 
particular social problem. Common law and legislation has provided a 
resolution of this controversy, and limited the entitlement of injured 
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claimants to those cases in which they can identify the manufacturer of the 
product that caused their injury. 
 
As noted above, however, a legal entitlement, E, does not depend solely 
on the law, L, but may require a prior determination of the relevant facts, F. 
The combination of L + F (client can identify manufacturer) produces a 
different entitlement, as compared with L + F* (client cannot identify 
manufacturer). On the functional account underlying the modified standard 
conception, lawyers must have some obligation to avoid manipulation of the 
facts in such a way that changes the entitlement of clients relative to the 
baseline established by the legal process. But this way of thinking about it 
appears to run immediately into a regress problem. Lawyers representing 
clients in litigation are themselves part of the legal process that produces 
client entitlements, so how can we say what the content of E is prior to the 
completion of the adversarial litigation process? The answer is that this 
regress is only apparent. A lawyer can know, prior even to agreeing to 
represent a client, the content of E, based on assumptions about the facts 
that can be fairly easily verified. For example, a lawyer may see that the 
client may recover, provided that F obtains, where F = “the client can 
identify the manufacturer.” The fact that a society is characterized by 
conflict about justice, which is the starting point for both the Markovits and 
Hazard/Remus positions, says nothing about whether a lawyer should be 
permitted to “refresh” the “recollection” of clients regarding the 
manufacturer’s identity. The social conflict has been resolved, and the 
decision made to limit the entitlement to a tort recovery to those clients who 
can single out the defendant, at least to a more-likely-than-not level of 
certainty. There may be determinacy with respect to a fact/law combination, 
just as there is with respect to law, at least in many cases. 
 
In contrast with rhetorical theorists who emphasize the meaning-making 
function of the trial process,172 this account sounds narrow, dry, even banal. 
Surely there is more going on in adversarial litigation than the simple 
determination of what is the case, factually speaking, and then the 
application of law to those facts. If Markovits is right, and the role of 
adversarial advocacy is to legitimate the application of law, and legitimacy 
involves making sense of the relationship between the outcome and the 
constitutive values of the legal system, then the relationship between the 
ethics of advocacy and truth is not so straightforward. Commenting on 
Hayden White’s philosophy of history based on the classical rhetorical 
tradition, Bernard Williams asks, 
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if a narrative is said to make sense of some (extended) period of the 
past, and this means that it makes the right or correct sense of it, to what 
extent is this . . . a matter of truth and truthfulness? White’s answer to 
this question is “Very little.”173  
 
Williams goes on to caution readers, however, not to make too much of 
White’s stance on historical truth – it is not the case, even for a rhetorician 
like White, that all interpretations of a past event are equally arbitrary.174 
While making sense of large-scale historical and cultural phenomena is 
largely a matter of interpretation, but part of that process – the smaller-scale 
part, if you like – consists of filling in the factual details, and this part has 
“a relatively unproblematic connection with the truth.”175 Moreover, 
White’s reliance on the rhetorical tradition to ground his philosophy of 
history overlooks the importance of community to classical rhetoric. One 
might ask of a historian, “Would you buy an interpretation from this 
person?” and, as Williams rightly notes, history is different from 
propaganda or fiction.176 Any rhetorician must be responsive to the needs of 
her audience. The audience of a historian is interested in making sense of 
the past, but the audience of a judicial decision or a jury trial is looking, yes, 
to make sense of the community’s commitment to justice and rights, and to 
know the content of its constitutive values, but also to know how those 
normative commitments make a difference to what citizens owe to each 
other in light of what is the case, factually speaking. 
 
The account of legitimation given here is liberal and democratic. As 
such, it has a definite relationship to truthfulness. Liberalism is mistrustful 
of state power, but it would be a serious mistake to believe that ethical 
constraints on playing games with the truth are liable to lead to 
aggrandizement of state power. Williams reminds us of one of the teachings 
of the Enlightenment tradition, that the promotion of historical truth 
“uniquely discourages some famous enemies of it, such as a state or 
religious monopoly.”177 The capacity of the law and the legal system to 
serve as an effective check on state power may depend on it being generally 
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perceived as having a fairly secure connection with the truth. The 
legitimation argument given in this paper is not, however, primarily based 
on the law serving as a constraint on power. Rather, the underlying ethical 
ideal is that of the freedom and equality of citizens. Where there is 
uncertainty and disagreement, the law provides a means to settle on what 
should be done, in terms that can reasonably be accepted by those affected 
by it. Commenting on the inherent circularity in Rawls’s ideal of 
reasonableness, Burton Dreeben suggested that one way out of the circle 
would be to analogize public reason to the considerations relied upon by a 
judge deciding a litigated dispute: 
 
What is involved in being reasonable and rational is very difficult to lay 
out . . . but you’ll see what they come to in practice. . . [T]o truly 
understand what Rawls is teaching, you have to understand the way the 
best appellate judges work. . . [W]hat [appellate judges] are always 
engaged in, when they are at their best, is what Rawls means by public 
reason. Constantly what you are confronted with in our system is how 
basic ideas, basic concepts such as freedom and equality, are to be 
turned into conceptions, how they really are to be applied and developed 
into workable principles. To be a serious political philosopher, one 
should understand the development of the common law and what a great 
judge does; that is the heart of the subject.178 
 
The law can provide this type of reasoned justification if it bears some 
relationship with what is the case. The practice of adversarial litigation must 
be truthful in order to legitimate. Go back to the example of the pedestrian 
who tripped on the sidewalk. Recall that the sidewalk was not defective 
directly in front of the church, but in front of the house across the street 
from the church there were sizeable cracks and holes. The lawyers, 
however, coached their client to say that she had fallen on the sidewalk in 
front of the house, even though she had initially reported falling in front of 
the church. The outcome of the litigation may be a judgment against the 
homeowner requiring a payment of, say, $25,000 to the pedestrian. Imagine, 
counterfactually (because in reality the case would likely settle and the 
damages be paid by a third-party insurer), that the homeowner refused to 
pay and the local sheriff came to haul away $25,000 worth of assets to 
satisfy the judgment. If the homeowner said something like, “What the hell 
are you doing?”, the sheriff might simply say, “I have a gun, you can’t stop 
me,” but would much more likely appeal to the notion of a right to seize the 
property. “You lost a case, fair and square, after the jury heard all the 
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testimony – pay up.” The idea of public reason, and of the law as an 
exclusionary reason that functions to permit coexistence in a society 
characterized by disagreement, is that the person to whom such a 
justification is addressed can appreciate its force and agree that it provides a 
reason to do what the law requires. Now imagine two different versions of 
the factual story underlying the justification for seizing the homeowner’s 
property: 
 
1. The plaintiff in fact fell on the sidewalk in front of your house. 
 
2. It was very important to the plaintiff that she tell a story in court in 
which she fell on the sidewalk in front of your house. 
 
This is a bit silly, but hopefully it is clear that when understanding law 
in terms of public reason-giving, it makes a difference whether the reasons 
purport to be backed by truth, as opposed to merely someone’s say-so. The 
subjective perspective of the plaintiff, who has a story she really wants to 
tell, is neither here nor there from the point of view of whether a judgment 
rendered against the homeowner is based on adequate reason. Subjectivists 
like Markovits may respond that legitimation is not a matter only of a story 
being told, but also of being received – that is, treated with the appropriate 
attitude of being considered in good faith by official decision-makers. 
Following Luban’s suggestion, the legal system must treat its subjects with 
dignity, and it fails to do so by treating their stories as unworthy of at least 
provisional belief. From this it follows that a lawyer’s ethical duties are to 
ensure that her client’s point of view receives due consideration. While 
there is a great deal to admire in this position, it nevertheless seems 
incomplete. Perhaps the client’s story being considered in good faith is a 
necessary condition for legitimacy, but not a sufficient one without some 
assurance being offered, to those whose interests are affected by legal 
decisions, that the coercive use of force in the state is responsive to factual 
truth. 
 
Sharpening the point a bit, Justification #2 verges close to being 
bullshit, in the sense of the word explored by Harry Frankfurt. A lie actually 
manifests respect for the truth, because lying is parasitic on truthful 
practices. One must have the truth somewhere in view to be a liar.179 A 
bullshitter, however, displays only contempt and disrespect, both for truth 
and for the person to whom bullshit is directed, because bullshit is utterly 
indifferent to the truth. A theme of Frankfurt’s study is that bullshit may be 
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more corrosive of truthful practices than lying. Liars are concerned about 
the truth so they can avoid it; bullshitters don’t care. Over time, allowing 
bullshit to pervade a practice or institution may reinforce an attitude of 
indifference to truth. To this critique, Markovits and others who favor a 
subjective perspective on truth would presumably deny that it is bullshit for 
someone to say, “this is my truth.” Recall that Markovits’s signal virtue for 
lawyers is negative capability. An ethical lawyer is supposed to be an empty 
vessel, into which her client’s story is poured. Only by performing this role 
can the lawyer contribute to the legitimation of political authority at the 
level of individual citizens because, for Markovits, legitimation depends on 
an affective engagement with the process of adjudication. The pedestrian in 
the sidewalk example needs to participate in a process in which both parties 
to the dispute can have their preferences altered and this, he thinks, requires 
a credulous attitude toward the truthfulness of her factual assertions.  
 
Setting aside the observation that the lawyers in the sidewalk case did 
not exercise negative capability, but in fact positively altered their client’s 
story, there is a curious asymmetry in Markovits’s reliance on 
transformative engagement. It is of vital importance that the client’s story is 
heard, without prejudgment or interference by the lawyer. The lawyer must 
efface her own perspective on the client’s story. But the perspective of the 
other party, the homeowner, is also effaced, underscoring that, for 
Markovits, legitimation has little to do with truthfulness, and everything to 
do with telling one’s client’s story. (Luban, Hazard and Remus, and Simon 
also incline in this direction.) It is a bullshitter’s approach to legitimation 
because it is utterly indifferent to truth. Of course, all these scholars have a 
reason for favoring an account of ethical lawyering that is indifferent to 
truth – Markovits, his concern for the first-personal perspective of both the 
client and the lawyer; Hazard and Remus, because no party or partisan 
advocate has access to ultimate truth; Simon owing to the subordination of 
factual truth to justice. But nowhere in any of these ethical theories is there 
an acknowledgement of the requirement that affected, non-client parties be 
able to endorse the reasons given by the lawyer in justification of her 
actions. The idea of a legal entitlement, which underlies a moderate version 
of the standard conception of legal ethics, incorporates both legal norms 
(derived from cases, statutes, etc.) and propositions about what is true in the 
natural world. With respect to both aspects of an entitlement, a legal 
reasoner (a lawyer or a  judge) may have varying degrees of confidence. 
Lawyers familiarly couch their advice regarding legal outcomes with 
estimates concerning the likelihood that a judge will accept their 
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argument.180 It is fallacious to infer from the prevalence of close calls on 
legal arguments to the conclusion that there is no such thing as an utterly 
unsupported, completely meritless position.181 A similar type of confidence 
assessment may be made with respect to facts. But here is the important 
thing: If adversary advocacy is to serve as a process of public reason-giving, 
it has to have more to say about factual truth than simply, “my client says 
P,” coupled with an attitude of skepticism about ultimate truth. 
 
Whether skeptics about ultimate truth or committed to the view that 
clients deserve a non-judgmental spokesperson, the subjectivist theorists 
considered here all rely on considerations of political legitimacy, yet they 
under-value the role of truthfulness in legitimate political institutions. To 
this critique they might respond that truthfulness cannot be an aspect of 
legitimation in a pluralistic society in which reasonableness, as a political 
ideal, is weighted with the burdens of judgment.182 The burdens of 
judgment, leading to reasonable disagreement among members of society, 
include not only pluralism about value, but also uncertainty about the 
empirical evidence bearing on the resolution of disagreement.183 In 
response, and to conclude this discussion, it may be helpful to specify what 
is required by the ethical duty of truthfulness in advocacy. 
 
First, in the ordinary case, a lawyer is permitted to advance a position 
that has some evidentiary support, even if the lawyer believes (and even 
reasonably so) that the client will not prevail in the end. The reason for this 
is that responsibility for effectuating the social settlement of disagreement is 
distributed among the participants in the process of adversarial 
adjudication.184 Experienced lawyers know that things are not always as 
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they seem.185 Going back to the problem of the rose garden, Black may 
have told her lawyer that she has openly snipped the flowers, but the lawyer 
may subsequently learn that this is a lie or a mistake, and that in fact Black 
has never done anything openly and notoriously that is inconsistent with 
White’s claim to title. As long as the lawyer conducted a reasonable 
investigation before filing the lawsuit, she has done nothing wrong, either 
legally (under applicable procedural law) or ethically. The process of 
investigation, discovery, motions practice, and trial will eventually force 
parties to clarify their positions, “put up or shut up” with evidence 
supporting their claims, and uncover any inconsistencies in the evidence 
that might require the parties to revise their positions. The arguments here 
are intended to be consistent with the general structure of decentralized, 
party-controlled litigation that is characteristic of the American civil justice 
system.186 One aspect of this system is the existence of procedural 
entitlements to assert claims that have adequate factual foundation, but are 
somewhere short of being conclusively established. There is a good reason 
for this: A liberal pleading system, including relatively undemanding duties 
of pre-filing investigation by attorneys, lowers access barriers to bringing a 
lawsuit to vindicate one’s legal rights.187 Derived as they are from the 
structure and procedures of a legal system, the ethical obligations of 
lawyers reflect our society’s preference for handling many grievances 
through the mechanism of the adversary system of justice.188 
 
Second, the objective perspective on the relationship between facts and 
legitimacy should not be taken to imply some kind of unattainable God’s-
eye point of view. There may be genuine uncertainty about a matter of fact, 
e.g. whether the plaintiffs in the Texas case were exposed to asbestos fibers 
from the product of a still-solvent manufacturer, or a mixed question of law 
and fact such as whether Black gained title to White’s rose garden through 
adverse possession. It is quite clear as a matter of the positive law 
governing lawyers that there would be no duty in such a case to refrain from 
presenting a claim or defense based on partial evidence. It should also be 
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clear, however, that a lawyer does not act unethically in these circumstances 
(again, as a matter of critical morality, not positive law) by vigorously 
representing a client and seeking to establish a claim to the relevant 
standard of proof. As noted above,189 the standard of proof in criminal cases 
underwrites an ethical permission to construct a narrative out of bits and 
pieces of factually true evidence that the lawyer knows is false. By calling 
the ethical stance advocated in this paper an objective perspective, my 
intention is only to delink the lawyer’s ethical obligation from the client’s 
interests or story, connecting them instead with testimony and other 
evidence that bears on what is the case, factually speaking. In this way, it 
simply carries through the critique of the standard conception as applied to 
law. As two influential distinctions – that drawn by David Luban’s, between 
High Realism and Low Realism, and by Tim Dare, between mere zeal vs. 
hyper zeal – show, there is a difference between what one can get the legal 
system to yield as an outcome and what one ought to get from the legal 
system as a matter of right.190 The benchmark for the ethical permissibility 
of a lawyer’s actions, in a representative capacity on behalf of a client, is 
whether it is a good faith effort to obtain or protect the client’s legal 
entitlement. This differs from the unmodified standard conception, which 
uses the client’s interests as the ethical benchmark, with the proviso that no 
unlawful means can be used in pursuing the client’s interests. All this paper 
is intended to do is clarify that, if one accepts the democratic political 
foundations of the approach to legal ethics put forward by the supporters of 
the modified standard conception, then lawyers should take up the same 
stance toward facts as they do with respect to law.  
 
Finally, one might ask why there is an ethical analysis at all, beyond 
ascertaining whether the rules permit the use of some piece of factual 
material. The rules of procedure and the law governing lawyers create 
entitlements, and I have argued that lawyers have a sufficient ethical 
justification when they act to vindicate a client’s legal entitlement. Why 
should, say, Model Rule 3.3(a), which permits a lawyer to introduce 
evidence she reasonably believes (but does not know) to be false, be treated 
differently from the statute of limitations, the attorney-client privilege, and 
other legal doctrines often analyzed by legal ethics scholars?191 The 
response is that substantive and procedural entitlements are treated in 
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exactly the same way, but what a lawyer (legally and morally) permissibly 
may do for a client is limited by the bounds of the law. As the Luban/Dare 
critique of legal realism shows, this constraint on permissible advocacy is 
given by what the law actually permits or requires, not by any advantage a 
lawyer may happen to be able to maintain, using legal processes. The same 
critique carries through to what might be called realism about facts. The 
subjectivist theorists – the target of this paper – are in the same position as 
the Low Realists or hyper-zealous advocates criticized by Luban and Dare. 
With respect to law, the unmodified standard conception of legal ethics 
requires lawyers to advocate any position that will not subject them to legal 
sanctions, and which is in the interests of their client. But the modified 
version of the standard conception directs lawyers to respect the rights and 
duties actually established by law, not what they may happen to be able to 
manipulate the legal system into yielding. The little schema, E = L + F, is 
meant to remind lawyers that entitlements have factual and legal 
components, and if one believes that the ethical permissibility of advocacy 
has something to do with a legitimate legal process that establishes 
entitlements, then these considerations of legitimacy also require a similar 
attitude toward factual evidence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As a matter of the political ethics of the lawyer’s role, in order to act 
with justification, notwithstanding the ordinary moral evaluation of the 
lawyer’s actions as lying or cheating, an advocate must advance a plausible 
story regarding her client’s entitlement. This entitlement has legal and 
factual components, and the lawyer must have at least some reason to 
believe that they have adequate support. This seems like such a moderate 
position, but it is actually against the grain of both legal ethics theory and 
the tacit ethical norms of practicing lawyers, which emphasize the partiality 
of the lawyer’s duties. It is true that lawyers traditionally have understood 
themselves as zealous advocates, but it is sometimes forgotten that this 
maxim ends with the qualification, “. . . within the bounds of the law.”192 
When it comes to the legal norms governing the situation of clients, many 
scholars have come to accept that the law is not equivalent to what one can 
get away with; rather, there is sufficient determinacy in the law, in many 
cases, to permit ethical criticism of lawyers to be grounded in their apparent 
abuse or manipulation of the law. This paper seeks only to extend this 
analysis modestly, to suggest a critical stance that one can also take toward 
lawyers manipulating factual evidence. In many cases, of course, there is 
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sufficient uncertainty or ambiguity to justify an advocate in taking a 
position that may turn out not to be “ultimate truth,” in the sense of what is 
established at trial. But the possibility of ambiguity should not be used to 
support a robustly subjective position regarding factual evidence. Relying 
exclusively on the client’s version of the truth, as the subjective position 
recommends, risks losing the connection with the political values that 
support the legal system and the lawyer’s ethical role.  
